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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
VS. 1 
MICHAEL C. THOMPSON and i 
BRUCE A. CONKLIN, 
i Case No. 880-181 
t Priority Classification 
No. 13 
Defendants-Petitioners, 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in admitting evidence 
obtained by the use of the Subpoena Powers Act? 
2. Is a contract, combination or conspiracy to 
foreclose competitiors from bidding for or submitting proposals 
for exclusive, lucrative security guard contracts a criminal 
group boycott under the Utah Antitrust Act? 
3. Is racketeering a crime separate from the predicate 
offenses to racketeering, thus meriting separate punishment? 
4. Did a juror's knowledge of the conviction of a co-
defendant require a mistrial? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Court of Appeals' decision, of which petitioners 
seek review, is State v. Thompson, et al.. 751 P.2d 805 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to grant or deny the 
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2-2(5) (1987). Petitioners seek review of the Utah 
Court of Appeals decision entered March 9, 1988, which was denied 
rehearing on April 8, 1988. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling constitutional and statutory provisions 
are reproduced in full in the appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants have petitioned this Court for a writ of 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, seeking to challenge the 
court's affirmance of a jury verdict and conviction of petitioner 
Michael C. Thompson, of five counts of bribery in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B misdemeanor; one 
count of antitrust violation under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-914 
and 76-10-920, and two counts of racketeering in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, each a felony of the second degree; 
and of petitioner Bruce A. Conklin, of five counts of bribery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B 
misdemeanor, one count of antitrust violation under Utah Code 
Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and one count of racketeering in 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, a felony of the second 
degree. Co-defendant Michael Ziemski's convictions were also 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this casef but defendant 
Ziemski did not petition this Court for a writ of certiorari. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case was tried to a jury in Third Judicial 
District Court, Judge Judith M. Billings, presidingf on July 19 
through August 1, 1985. Following trialf the jury found each 
defendant guilty of five counts of bribery and of all antitrust 
and racketeering counts (R. 408-413). 
On September 13f 1985, the trial court sentenced 
petitioner Thompson to serve not less than one year nor more than 
15 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 455-457). Petitioner 
Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake County 
Jail on work release (R. 440-443). Defendants were each fined 
$25,000.00 for the antitrust violations (R. 441, 448), and were 
forced to forfeit their interests in the guard companies. 
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on September 13, 
1985. Petitioner's sentences were stayed on appeal, and their 
initial brief as well as the State's response was filed in this 
Court. Subsequently, the case was transferred by this Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. The case was then certified to this 
Court by the Court of Appeals, but was returned to the Court of 
Appeals where the case was briefed and argued. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed petitioners1 convictions in an opinion published 
March 9, 1988, and denied petitioner's Petition for Rehearing on 
April 8, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brent Fletcher was 
employed as security officer for Utah Power and Light Company 
(UP&L) (R. 737-9). As security officer, Fletcher's duties were 
to determine the security needs of the company, make 
recommendations to management, and act as coordinator between 
management and the security guard services (R. 738-9). In 1978, 
UP&L decided to hire the services of a security guard company on 
a full-time basis. On Fletcher's recommendation, UP&L executed a 
contract with defendant Michael Thompson's company, Mike Thompson 
Associates (MTA), in February 1978 (R. 739-40). This contract 
was not competitively bid (R. 741-2)• 
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother-in-law, was 
hired by MTA (R. 980-2). At Fletcher's request, Wall opened a 
bank account in the name of Security Management Consultant 
Services (R. 991-2). Between January and June 1979, Wall 
deposited approximately $23,000 in checks from MTA into this 
account (R. 1340). In June 1979, Wall turned over the account 
and its records to Fletcher at his request (R. 995). UP&L and 
MTA renewed their contract in March 1981 (R. 742-4). 
Thompson left MTA in 1982 and formed Information 
Associates, a security consulting firm, with defendant Bruce 
Conklin, a former employee of MTA (R. 239-40). Defendant Michael 
Ziemski, also a former employee, took control of MTA and signed a 
new contract with UPfcL in October 1982 (R. 750-1). Ziemski later 
changed the name of MTA to Vanguard International Associates, 
Inc. (R. 752). In 1983, Ziemski transferred control of Vanguard 
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to Conklin (R. 752). An assignment of the UP&L contract was 
executed in March 1984 (R. 755). 
During the spring of 1983, Information Associates 
deposited approximately $25,000, in seven separate payments, into 
the account of Augie Investments, also owned by Fletcher (R. 
1336). Meanwhile, Vanguard deposited about $163,000 into the 
account of Information Associates (R. 1337)• 
RELATED CASE 
In State v. Fletcher. 751 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1988), 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Brent Fletcher. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
examples of circumstances in which it is appropriate for this 
Court to exercise its discretion in granting the writ of 
certiorari. While this list is not exclusive and does not 
purport to limit this Court's discretion in granting the writ, it 
would appear that this Courtfs certiorari jurisdiction will be 
invoked only in unusual circumstances. 
Petitioners seek to characterize the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals in this case as extraordinary, in order to 
persuade this Court to exercise the extraordinary certiorari 
jurisdiction. However, the Court of Appeals properly followed 
precedents from Utah, and where appropriate, from other 
jurisdictions, in deciding petitioners1 appeal, and there is no 
need for this Court to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals 
through granting the writ of certiorari. 
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I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONERS 
HAVE NO STANDING TO INVOKE THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THEM AT TRIAL, 
BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, THE GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION APPLIES 
Petitioners refer to this Court's decision in In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 
31, 1988), and State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), 
seeking to obtain the writ of certiorari by noting that the 
exclusionary rule and good faith exception were addressed in 
their case by the trial court before these opinions were 
published, and by the Court of Appeals before In the Matter of a 
Criminal Investigation, supra, was published. However, 
petitioners' main argument focuses on the good faith exception 
analysis, which is relevant only after the exclusionary rule is 
applied. As petitioners noted on page 67 of their brief on 
appeal, the majority of the evidence used to convict petitioners 
"consisted primarily of business records obtained from 
defendants' accountants and banks." To this evidence, 
petitioners have no standing to object. While petitioners would 
have had standing to object to the admission of evidence gained 
through subpoenas directed at them, petitioners never alleged, 
let alone established, a violation of their personal rights. 
A. 
PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE MAJORITY OF THE EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED AGAINST THEM AT TRIAL BECAUSE 
THE SUBPOENAS USED TO GATHER THE 
EVIDENCE WERE NOT SENT TO PETITIONERS 
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Under both Utah and federal law, petitioners may not 
seek the suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule 
unless they can show a violation of their fourth amendment 
rights. State v. Montavne, 414 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah), cert. 
denied. 385 U.S. 939 (1966). See also Rakas v. Illinois. 439 
U.S. 128, 134 (1978), citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 347 (1974). While the exclusionary rule is sometimes 
applied differently to evidence obtained by warrant and evidence 
obtained by subpoena, a violation of a fourth amendment right is 
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining suppression of evidence 
gathered by either. United States v. Miller» 425 U.S. 435 
(1976) . 
Petitioners have failed to establish a violation of 
their fourth amendment rights relating to the evidence gained 
through the Subpoena Powers Act, because the majority of the 
evidence they seek to challenge was not obtained from them, but 
from various banks and accountants. Appellant's Brief to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 67. As to any other evidence which may 
have been admitted, the petitioners fail to establish how the 
admission of such evidence was a violation of their 
constitutional rights. Numerous cases demonstrate that in these 
circumstances, petitioners have no standing to challenge the 
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evidence obtained by subpoenas sent to third parties.^ 
While this Court has repeatedly noted its desire to 
establish independent constitutional analysis under the Utah 
Constitution, the facts in this case do not justify the creation 
of a new privacy interest under the Utah Constitution. Courts 
recognizing a privacy interest in bank records under their state 
constitutions have only done so when there is a complete lack of 
court process in the seizure of records, e.g.» Burrows v. 
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974), and state courts 
generally reserve their expansion of state constitutional search 
and seizure provisions for cases in which there is an immediate 
and intimate violation of privacy interests. See Lafave, Search 
and Seizure, section 1.3, p. 44 
x
 See United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) ("Since 
no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor are implicated 
here, this case is governed by the general rule that the issuance 
of a subpoena to a third party to obtain thee records of that 
party does not violate the rights of a def endant") j SEC v. Jerry 
T. O'Brien. Inc.. 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) ("It is established 
that, when a person communicates information to a third party 
even on the understanding that the communication is confidential, 
he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or 
records thereof to law enforcement authorities. Relying on that 
principle, the Court has held that a customer of a bank cannot 
challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds the admission into evidence 
in a criminal prosecution of financial records obtained by the 
Government from his bank pursuant to allegedly defective 
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given no notice of the 
subpoenas"), gee also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 
(1969) ("[D]efendants failed to establish any prejudice to their 
own constitutional rights. . . . They wrongly seek to establish 
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a 
consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone else and 
failed to prove an invasion of their own privacy"). 
-8-
B. 
EVEN IF PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SUBPOENAED EVIDENCE, THE 
COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION ON THIS ISSUE 
COMPORTS WITH THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS IN 
gTATE V. MENDOZA AND IlLJEHJEJ^JSR QF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), this 
Court struck down the statutory good faith exception relied on by 
the trial court in admitting the evidence obtained under 
subpoena. While this Court declined to endorse the United States 
Supreme Court's Leon analysis of the exclusionary rule and good 
faith exceptionf this Court noted that the exclusionary rule is 
applied when there is a fourth amendment violation, and that the 
good faith analysis may apply thereafter if an exception to the 
application of the exclusionary rule is warranted. Mendoza at 
185, 186. 
The Court of Appeals did not address directly 
petitioners1 lack of standing to invoke the exclusionary rule 
against all the evidence gained under the Subpoena Powers Act,2 
but proceeded directly to analyzing whether or not the non-
statutory good faith exception should apply.3 
2
 "Defendants contend the government's actions were in violation 
of their individual rights to and expectations of privacy." 
State v. Thompson. 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Ut. App. 1988). 
3
 The Court of Appeals apparently misread this Court's opinion in 
Mendoza. "Furthermore, section 77-35-12(g) went beyond the scope 
of the good faith exception in requiring defendants to prove a 
substantial violation of their fourth amendment rights." 
Thompson at 809. In Mendoza. this Court struck down Rule 12(g) 
because "12(g) . . . shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, 
who must prove the equivalent of police conduct made in bad faith 
before the court can apply the exclusionary rule." I&. at 186. 
-9-
In Mendoza, this Court's discussion of United States v^  
Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and of Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 
1160 (1987), focused on the basis for the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule: "[Elxcluding illegally-seized evidence 
when a police officer has received authorization to conduct a 
search, has restricted his search to the boundaries of the 
authorization, and has a reasonable basis for relying on the 
authorization would defeat the ends of justice.M frtendoza, at 
185. See also Mendoza, n. 3 ("In both cases, the officers 
conducting the searches did so in objectively reasonable reliance 
on prior, external authorization11) . While this Court did not 
expressly adopt the deterrence rationale as the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, Mendoza at 185, this Court's language 
discussing that purpose describes the circumstances in the 
instant case. 
Judge Bunnell authorized the investigation, and the 
Attorney General's agents relied on this authorization and the 
Subpoena Powers Act itself in conducting the investigation. 
Thus, there was reliance on external authorization for the 
subpoenas. 
This Court in In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation. 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 31, 1988), found that 
in the investigation conducted by the Attorney General in this 
case, the Subpoena Powers Act was: 
• . .improperly applied in at least 
three respects: 
First, each subpoena included a 
statement that it was "authorized by order of 
the District Court" and that "disobedience to 
this order is punishable by contempt of 
Court." 
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• • • 
The second aspect of the Act's improper 
usage is the failure of the state's attorneys 
to notify every respondent, prior to 
interrogation or production of evidence, of 
the general nature and scope of the 
investigation and of the right to exercise 
the privilege against self incrimination. 
• • • 
Finally, we find that the secrecy 
provisions of the Act were applied too 
broadly. 
Id. at 17. None of these improprieties have been demonstrated to 
have any connection with these petitioner's rights under the 
fourth amendment or Utah Constitution. 
Under the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary 
rule, the good faith exception would apply to the facts of this 
case, in the event that petitioners had shown a violation of 
their fourth amendment rights justifying the initial application 
of the exclusionary rule. The Court of Appeals' language in this 
case demonstrates that, contrary to petitioners' allegation, the 
court did not shift the burden of showing bad faith to 
petitioners, but analyzed the facts of this case in applying the 
good faith exception: 
In Mendoza, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted, "Krull does not affect our 
characterization of Leon, In both cases, the 
officers conducting the searches did so in 
objectively reasonable reliance on prior, 
external authorization." 748 P.2d at 185 n. 
3. Likewise, in the instant case, the 
subpoenas duces tecum were executed in 
objectively reasonable reliance on prior, 
external authorization. 
State v, Thompson. at 809-810. 
Petitioners cite no authority for distinguishing 
between police officers, attorneys, or investigators in the 
11-
context of the good faith exception. Nothing in In the MattejL QL 
a Criminal Investigation nor in Mendoza changes the initial 
burden which petitioners must meet to establish a violation of 
their rights and their entitlement to suppression of evidence. 
At no stage during this case have petitioners challenged any 
subpoena issued personally to them, nor established any standing 
to raise issues vicariously involving subpoenas issued to third 
parties. Thus, the ruling of the Court of Appeals should stand 
and this Court should reject the Petition for Certiorari. 
II. 
DEFENDANTS WERE PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A 
CRIMINAL BOYCOTT UNDER THE UTAH 
ANTITRUST ACT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
Preliminarily, petitioners suggest that their petition 
for a writ of certiorari as to the antitrust convictions should 
be granted because: (1) one member of the Court of Appeals panel 
filed a dissent;* and (2) this is the "first published judicial 
treatment of Utah's Antitrust Act." (Pet. at 12) .5 However, 
neither argument meets the requirements of Rule 43 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court for granting the writ. Without saying 
it, petitioners apparently rely upon Rule 43(3) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court to support their petition when they argue 
4
 Judge Orme dissented only as to the antitrust convictions of 
petitioners. 
5
 While it is true that this is the first published decision 
under the present Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-911 
et seq.. there were several decisions under the prior, similar 
act. ££e, £*£•# Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Association 
14 Utah 2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1963); Zions Service Corp. Vj 
Danielson, 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982 (1961). 
-12-
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) bribery 
plus other affirmative acts in restraint of trade may violate the 
Utah Antitrust Act; (2) the illegal conduct involved in this case 
was not merely the competitive effect of an exclusive dealing 
arrangement but was the foreclosing of competition for that 
contract; and (3) the object of a group boycott may be all 
competitors of the conspirators, in this case, all the security 
guard companies who wanted to compete with petitioners for both 
the UP&L security guard contract but who were prevented from 
doing so by the boycott of petitioners and UP&L's security 
director. 
As will be demonstrated, no error was made and the 
petition should be denied. 
A. 
PETITIONERS NOT ONLY PAID BRIBES TO UTAH 
POWER AND LIGHTS SECURITY DIRECTOR BUT 
ENGAGED IN ACTS INTENDED TO RESTRAIN 
TRADE 
The Court of Appeals held, citing Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Hitachi Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 
1982), that "[w]hen bribery is coupled with other acts tending to 
restrain trade, a claim under the Sherman Act may be 
established." Thompson. 751 P.2d at 810-11. The Court of 
Appeals correctly held that the conduct of petitioners was not 
only commercial bribery, but was also an illegal group boycott. 
The dissent concluded that under the definition of 
commercial bribery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508(1)(a) (1978), and 
the majority's interpretation of it, every commercial bribe would 
be an antitrust violation. Thompson. 751 P.2d at 819. This is a 
• fUnHnAfA- Araument logically rejected by the majority: 
Commercial bribes paid to an employee, agent, 
or fiduciary of UP&L could be for other 
purposes, including rate adjustments, waiver 
of service fees, and waiver of safety 
requirements. Such purposes are clearly not 
in restraint of trade or anticompetitive. 
!£• at 811. Those acts do not illegally restrain trade. Here, 
however, there were several affirmative acts in restraint of 
trade: "[T]he prosecution presented substantial evidence of 
other affirmative acts in restraint of trade, e.g., Fletcher's 
refusal to accept proposals from other security guard 
companies...11 (jji.) and the refusal to submit the security guard 
contracts to competitive bidding. Id.6 
Such conduct represents the "other acts tending to 
restrain trade" with which the bribery was "coupled." Hitachi., 
* The United States Supreme Court has long held that any 
agreement with its purpose to eliminate competitive bidding is 
illegal. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States. 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1977); Swift and Company v. United 
States. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). If UP&I/s security director, L. 
Brent Fletcher, had been required by the company to accept 
competitive bids, but those bids were rigged so that petitioners 
received the lucrative security guard contract, that conduct 
would clearly be criminal bid rigging. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
920. But for the fact that that one of the objects of the 
conspiracy was to prevent competitive bidding of the security 
guard contracts, the boycott here would clearly have been an 
illegal bid rig. The effect of the illegal boycott upon 
competition is the same as an illegal bid rig. 
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supra. 547 F. Supp. at 645.' 
B. 
THE ILLEGALITY OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT 
AROSE FROM THE CONSPIRACY TO FORECLOSE 
COMPETITION FOR AN EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
ARRANGEMENT NOT FROM THE CONTRACT ITSELF 
Petitioners attempt to disguise their conduct as an 
"agreement to deal exclusively with one party [which] necessarily 
contemplates a refusal to deal with other parties." (Pet. at 
13). Petitioners miss the point. The conviction of petitioners 
was not because the contracts were illegal but was because the 
group boycott conspiracy foreclosed competition for the 
contract.8 See, e.g.P Central Telecommunications. Inc. v. TCI 
Cablevision. Inc.. 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
1
 A commercial bribe and an antitrust violation are not mutually 
exclusive. In this case the payment of money to L. Brent 
Fletcher was simply the quid pro quo for Fletcher's aid in the 
anticompetitive conduct. It is only natural that an employee 
with the ability to award lucrative contracts is going to want to 
benefit for the risk of his anticompetitive conduct. Mallev-Duff 
k Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co.. 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), 
cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). (Compare the benefits Mr. 
Lloyd, an employee of Crown Life, received for his participation 
in a group boycott with L. Brent Fletcher's benefits received for 
his participation in the boycott. The only difference is 
Fletcher was charged with the crime of commercial bribery, Mr. 
Lloyd was not.) 
8
 The legality or illegality of an exclusive dealing arrangement 
looks to the competitive effect of the contract to determine 
whether or not it is an unreasonable restraint of trade in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975), 
Twin Cities Sports Service. Inc. v. Charles 0. Finlev jmd CpAr 
676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n. 9 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1009 
(1982) (cited by petitioners, Pet. at 14), or whether the effect 
of it "nay be to substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly..." in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal 
£&., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The contract itself was not challenged 
in this case. 
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denied. 107 S.Ct. 1358 (1987). In Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 
(1st Cir. 1981), the First Circuit rejected the identical 
"exclusive dealing" argument made here by petitioners and stated 
that such an argument "emphasizes the innocuous and ignores the 
ominous. . • subverting [of] normal commercial bidding to exclude 
appellant . . . On its face, this amounts to 'a concerted refusal 
to deal with a disfavored purchaser or seller.1M 641 F.2d 35-36 
(citing ^arry v. St. PfluJL Fir? ft Marine Insurance Qo. , 555 F.2d 
3, 1 (1st Cir. 1977) , af f'd sub nom. gt. Paul & Marine Insurance 
Co, v. Barrv. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).9 The normal competitive 
process for the security guard contracts was clearly subverted by 
the boycott of petitioners in this case.10 
C. 
PETITIONERS MISTAKENLY ATTEMPT TO APPLY 
THE "TARGET AREA" TEST OF ANTITRUST 
STANDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' GROUP 
BOYCOTT DEFINITION 
* The conpiracy between the petitioners and L. Brent Fletcher was 
identical to that in Corev. The only difference was that the 
Town of Falmouth, Massachusetts, unlike Fletcher, received no 
commercial bribes. Petitioners1 argument is to the effect that 
because the remuneration paid to Fletcher violated the commercial 
bribery statute, there can be no restraint of trade. This 
argument is not supported by the law. 
1 0
 Petitioners1 reliance upon Construction Aggregate Transport v. 
Florida Rock Industries. Inc.. 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983) is 
misplaced. The conduct involved there was unilateral not 
conspiratorial. 710 F.2d at 773. But the court recognized that 
even unilateral conduct in an exclusive dealing arrangment is not 
free from judicial scrutiny if there is "proof of competitive 
harm, or other illegal behavior." !£. The "other illegal 
behavior" here included inter alia the unlawful agreement to 
boycott petitioners1 competitors and to refrain from competitive 
bidding. 
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Petitioners attack the Utah Court of Appeals' 
definition of group boycott and argue that there must be "a 
specific identifiable entity which has been singled out as the 
•target1 of the alleged boycott." Pet. at 15. The simple answer 
to this argument is that in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 
v. Barrv. 438 U.S. 531f 541 (1978), the Court rejected such a 
limitation of the group boycott definition. Instead, the Court 
held that the object of a group boycott can include not only 
competitors of the conspirators (438 U.S. at 542), as here, but 
can include the class of all policyholders or purchasers of 
services. Id., at 544. The Utah Court of Appeals aptly relied on 
t h e
 Barry decision to conclude that petitioners1 boycott was of 
all the security guard competitors of petitioners, gee Thompson, 
751 P.2d at 813. U 
Clearly, the Utah Court of Appeals applied 
substantial United States Supreme Court precedent and other 
federal court precedent in correctly interpreting and 
applying the Utah Antitrust Act. Therefore, this Court 
should not grant a writ of certiorari to review the Utah 
Court of Appeals1 decision to affirm the antitrust 
convictions. 
xx
 Petitioners rely on Reaemco. Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 
P.Supp. 546, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) for its "single entity, target 
area test." Reaemco discussed the "target area" test of 
antitrust standing and not as applicable to the group boycott 
definition. Since the Reaemco decision, the "target area" test 
of standing has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
in favor of a multi-factor standing test. Associated General 
Contractors of California v. California State Council of 
Carpenters. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
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III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PETITIONERS' RICE 
CONVICTIONS; THE COURT OF APPEALS 
CORRECTLY RESOLVED THIS ISSUE BY NOTING 
THE WELL-RECOGNIZED DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
MERE PREDICATE OFFENSES AND RACKETEERING 
Petitioners, as they did on appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, argue that their convictions under RICE "for misdemeanor 
briberies" violated their eighth amendment rights. The Court of 
Appeals correctly identified the weakness in petitioners' 
argument: 
In reviewing a claim of disproportionate 
punishment, the question is "whether the 
sentence imposed in proportion to the offense 
committed is such as to shock the moral sense 
of all reasonable men as to what is right and 
proper under the circumstances." State v. 
Hanson. 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
State v. Nance. 20 Utah 3d 372, 438 P.2d 542, 
544 (1968)) . 
Defendants1 argument ignores the 
additional elements required under the RICE 
Act, i.e. a pattern of racketeering activity, 
existence of an enterprise, and use of 
proceeds derived from the racketeering 
activity to establish, acquire, or operate 
the enterprise. Defendants claim these 
elements are illusory. We disagree. It is 
not the commercial briberies that are being 
punished in the present case, but the broader 
conduct which is forbidden by the RICE Act. 
££• United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 
1978), C££i. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 (1978) 
(Congress entitled to make pattern of 
racketeering an independent criminal offense 
punishable more severely than simply twice 
the penalty for each constituent offense). 
We do not find defendants1 sentences for the 
RICE violations unconstitutionally 
"shocking." 
ThQKPgPP* at 815-816. 
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Petitioners present no argument for challenging these 
precedents, but merely continue in their refusal to recognize the 
independent crime of racketeering. These circumstances do not 
justify this Court's issuance of the writ of certiorari. 
IV. 
A JUROR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVICTION OF 
A CO-DEFENDANT DOES NOT MERIT THIS 
COURT'S EXERCISE OF CERTIORARI 
JURISDICTION 
P e t i t i o n e r s c la im t h a t the Court of Appeals should have 
r eve r sed t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s and gran ted a m i s t r i a l in t h e i r case 
because of the cumula t ive e f f e c t on t he j u r o r s when two of the 
s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s mentioned the t r i a l of p e t i t i o n e r ' s co -
c o n s p i r a t o r , L. Brent F l e t c h e r , when one j u r o r read about 
F l e t c h e r ' s c o n v i c t i o n before p e t i t i o n e r s ' t r i a l concluded, and 
when the p r o s e c u t i o n used evidence of F l e t c h e r ' s use of ca sh , of 
"UP&L employee misconduct,1 - and when the p ro secu t i on used "bank 
r e c o r d s . " 
P e t i t i o n e r s c la im t h a t the Court of Appeals gave " s h o r t 
s h r i f t " t o t he se e v i d e n t i a r y d i s p u t e s , but f a i l t o i s o l a t e any 
error in the Court of Appeals' a n a l y s i s . The c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y 
addressed the i s s u e of the t r i a l and c o n v i c t i o n of L. Brent 
Fle tcher , fol lowing t h i s Court's d i r e c t i o n to defer to the 
judgment of the t r i a l court , pub l i shed in S t a t e v . Hodges . 517 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974) . The Court of Appeals concluded: 
[ d e f e n d a n t s . • . f a i l e d to show any c lear 
abuse of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . The 
t r i a l court and counsel both questioned the 
juror . The juror indicated the f a c t of 
F le tcher 1 8 convic t ion had no impact on her 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s and was not discussed with the 
other jury members. Furthermore, the t r i a l 
- 1 9 -
court adequately instructed the jury to only 
consider the evidence introduced at trial. 
Thompson at 818. 
The court correctly noted that in order to reverse a 
conviction on the grounds of the admission of inadmissible 
evidence, a defendant must show that the admission had Ma 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Thompson 
at 818, citing Utah Rule of Evidence 103 and State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah 1986). The court correctly noted that 
petitioners never demonstrated that the remaining allegedly 
erroneous admissions of evidence were prejudicial, and thus 
dismissed petitioners1 evidentiary challenges. Thompson at 818. 
The Court of Appeals correctly followed Utah precedent 
in evaluating the evidentiary disputes, and in petitioning for a 
writ of certiorari, petitioner has neither questioned the Court 
of Appeals' compliance with Utah precedent, nor presented any 
argument that this Court should reconsider that precedent. In 
short, petitioners have presented no grounds to induce this Court 
to exercise its extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the writ should be denied. 
DATED t h i s (OTJV day of O^IA^. , 1 9 8 8 . 
.Jb//.(QiL. 
STANLEYJH. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD M. HAGSTROW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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OtoMTII FJtfl 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
L. Brent FLETCHER, Michael C Thomp-
son. Bruce A. Conklln and Michael 
Z&enuki, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 86W57-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 9, 1988. 
Defendants were convicted in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ju-
dith M. Billings, J., of bribery, racketeer 
s*g, and slate antitrust vxftntions, and £>ey 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 
held that (1) evidence that defendants-
suppliers of security guard services for 
utility—bribed utility official in order to 
preclude other security guard companies 
from competing for contract was sufficient 
to establish conspiracy and restraint of 
trade in violation of state antitrust law; (2) 
state Racketeering Influences and Criminal 
Enterprise Act was not unconstitutionally 
vague due to fact that its application was 
aot limited to aerious and aggravated of-
fenses by organised crime; and (8) finding 
of "pattern" for purposes of RICE Act was 
supported by evidence that defendants paid 
aevea different bribes in two-week inter-
vals lor separate purposes. 
PUn^HER Utah 8 6 5 
•so****** mm 
I Criminal Law OM4.H2) 
£ven though statute allowing issuance 
0 f gttbpoena duces tecum in connection 
^ ^ secret investigations was subsequent-
ly f{?und to be unconstitutional, materials 
^t^jned pursuant to subpoena duces te-
c u m were admissible in subsequent erimi-
^ j /prosecution, where investigators acted 
b Jood faith, U.C.A.1953, 77-45-12(g); 
UJ5.£-A- ConstAmend. 4. 
^ monopolies o»31(14) 
findings that suppliers of securities 
igj^jces for utility participated in comroer-
CJJLJ pribery, and that bribed official refused 
^ ^xept proposals from other security 
£UAJ^ companies, were sufficient to estab-
to support suppliers' convictions under 
^ ^ Antitrust Act U.OA.1M3, 76-6-
Onne* J n dissented in part and (Bed 
if affidavit in support of arrest 
warrants faOed to establish probable 
aaj resulting illegality did not void 
t» pesvdtts its) 
Enforcement of subpoena duces tacum 
k subject to Fourth Amendment restric-
tions Sfainst uareaaooable aearches and 
VJ.CJL OssttUami. 4. 
t Monopolies 0*11(1.14) 
f er se group boycott exists where two 
or 0>ore competitors on same level of mar-
j t e t structure agree to eliminate target bor-
j^ptal competitor by combining to deny 
fMrget of elements needed in order to corn-
pet/ 
I Monopolies O-ltfl.lS) 
jtule of reason analysis has no part in 
erj1njnal provisions of state Antitrust Act 
VCM*&> 76-10*20. 
7 Monopolies 0-1*1.4, 1.14) 
Croup boycott under state Antitrust 
j ^ requires at least two conspirators, but 
mflft*** iMnfiwa A \*>7tt&»» nor ^few 
g^ket relationship with target is determh 
ngljvt of criminal KabOity; rather, intent of 
^tract* combination, or conspiracy is da-
eMjpg element U.CJU968, 76-10-080. 
u Monopolies *»S1(U> 
Evidence of agreement between fade* 
pePdent suppliers of security services for 
gtflfty and utility official, wherein official 
w i l bribed to refuse proposals from other 
iggiirity guard companies, was sufficient to 
igpblish {pbtence of conspiracy is form of 
gwpuP boycott for purposes of stats Anti-
J ^ t A e t U.CJL1KI, T*-1*-ttO. 
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I Criminal Law * 4 1 | 
When specific intent of defendant It 
element of criminal offense charged, intent 
may be inferred from defendant's conduct 
and surrounding circumstances. 
1*. Monopolies *»S1(1S) 
Finding that suppliers of security 
guard serrices for utility specifically in-
tended to eliminate competition was sup-
ported by evidence that suppliers bribed 
utility's security officer to refuse bids from 
other security guard companies. U.CJL 
1963, 76-10-614 to 76-10420. 
1L Disorderly Conduct #-1 
State Racketeering Influences and 
Criminal Enterprise Act is not limited in 
application to persons affiliated with orga-
nised crime. U.CJL196S, 76-10-1601 to 
76-1O-1601 
I I Disorderly Conduct *»1 
State Racketeering Influences and 
Criminal Enterprise Act was not unconsti-
tutionally vague due to its failure to limit 
its application to serious and aggravated 
offenses by organised crime. U.CJL1953, 
76-10-1601 to 76-10-1608; UACJL Const 
Amend. 14. 
11 Disorderly Conduct ^ 1 1 
8tatute pennfttng felony sentence for 
violation* of state Racketeering Influences 
and Criminal Enterprise Act based on pred-
icate misdemeanor of commercial bribery 
did not violate constitutional restraint 
against disproportionate punishment D.C. 
A.1968, 76~l<M602(lXh) (IMS). 
UL Pbocdetty Ccninrt »»1 
Statute allowing nse of misdemeanor 
offense of commercial bribery aa predicate 
Criminal Enterprise Act was not tmumtst 
ent with hsbltusl criminal statute or en-
hancement provision 6f Cuutioosd Balk 
•taaeea Act U.CJL190, »~l?-8(l)(»Xii& 
T**4W1; U.CJL196S, W-1<M«*1. 4k 
ft-ift-ieoaa-o otm. 
State FsfVKeei til Iafioenoes #nd 
Crtnbal Ehtetprise Act> <sflntton ef 
*£attera" aennlras nmuiafte tet nriated. 
criminal episodes as basis for pattern. 
U.CJU953, 76-1-401; U.CJLW68, 76-10-
1602(4) (1»85). 
16. Disorderly Conduct *•* 
Finding that defendants participated in 
''pattern" of criminal activity sufficient to 
support convictions under Racketeering In-
fluences and Criminal Enterprise Act was 
supported by evidence that defendants paid 
seven different bribes in approximately 
two-week intervals, and that there was sep-
arate purpose for each bribe. U.C.A.1953, 
76-1-401; U.CJL1953, 76-10-1602(4) 
(1985). 
17. Criminal Law e»U711(3) 
Instruction in bribery prosecution, 
which required showing of conduct con-
trary to interest of and without consent of 
employer, was not reversible error, even 
though jury was not specifically instructed 
that illegal bribe had to be paid with crimi-
nal intent 
11 Criminal Law *-667 
Defendants charged with commercial 
bribery were not entitled to mistrial after 
two witnesses mentioned trial of official 
who accepted bribes and one juror told 
court that she had read of official's convic-
tion* during trial; juror indicated fact of 
official's conviction had no impact on her 
deliberation and was not discussed with 
other jury members, and jury was instruct-
ed to consider only evidence introduced at 
trial 
Max D. Wheeler, Rodney R. Parker (ar-
gued), Snow, Christensen 4 Martineau, 
8aH Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants. 
David L WDdnson, State Atty. Gen., 
Stephen J. Sorenson, Chief, litigation Div., 
Richard M. Hagitroo (argued), David J. 
8chwendimaB (argued), Robert N. Parriah, 
Stanley ft Oisen, Aa*V At*ya. Gen* for 
plaintiff end respondent 
Balm BENCH, DAVtDSOMLand 
dftNCJJ. 
STATE v. 
OUM7SI rjd i 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendants appeal their convictions on 
several counts of bribery, antitrust, and 
racketeering. This appeal was initially 
filed with the Utah Supreme Court and was 
transferred to this Court pursuant to 
RUtah S.Ct 4A. We affirm the convic-
tions. 
Facts 
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brut 
Fletcher was employed as security officer 
for Utah Power and Light Company (UP 4 
11. AM security officer, Fletcher's duties 
were to determine the security needs of the 
company, make recommendations to 
management, and act ee coordinator be-
tween management and the security guard 
services. In 1978, UP 4 L decided to hire 
the services of a security guard company 
en a fun-time basis. On Fletcher's reeom-
•fcendatioo. UP 4 L executed a contract 
with defendant Michael Thompson's compa-
ny, Mike Thompson Associates (MTA), in 
February 1978. This contract was not com-
petitively bid. 
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother*-
law, was hired by MTA. At Fletcher's 
reqnest, WaO opened a bank account in the 
name of Security Management Consultant 
Services. Between January and June 1979, 
Wall deposited approximately $23,000 in 
cheeks from MTA into this account In 
June 1979, WaO turned over the account 
aad its reoords to Fletcher at his request 
UP A Land MTA renewed their contract in 
M*rtfcl96J. 
Tbotnpeoo left MTA b 1982 and formed 
Information Associates, a security coosuh-
fag firm, with defendant 3roee ConkHn, a 
former employee of MTA. Defendant Mi-
cfcac! Oemakt, ako a former employee, took 
eootrol of MTA aad signed a new contract 
with UP 4 L i n October 1982. SaasU 
lsler changed the name of MTA to Van-
gnard International Aaeodatae, Inc. . in 
1968, Bemsld transferred control of Van-
guard to ConkHa. An assignment of the 
OP 4 1 contract wan Stttsftd in Mareh 
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During the spring of 1983, Information 
Associates deposited approximately $25,-
000, in seven separate payments, into the 
account of Augie Investments, also owned 
by Fletcher. Meanwhile, Vanguard depos-
ited about $163,000 into the account of 
Information Associates. 
The State of Utah, alleging these multi-
ple payments to Fletcher were bribes as 
part of a scheme to eliminate competition 
for the UP A L security contract, charged 
Thompson with seven counts of commercial 
bribery, each a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. { 76-6~508(b) 
(1978), one count of antitrust group boy-
cott, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. f| 76-10-914 and -920 
(1979), and two counts of racketeering, sec-
ond degree felonies in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. | 76-10-1603 (1981). Ziemski 
and Conklin were each charged with seven 
counts of bribery, one count of antitrust 
group boycott, and one count of racketeer-
ing. Fletcher, also a defendant, was 
charged with counts similar to Thompson. 
Fletcher was tried separately and convicted 
prior to defendants' trial. His appeal is 
also decided this date. S*e State v. Fletch-
er, 751 P.2d 822 (Utah App.1988). 
Pretrial motions to dismiss all counts 
were denied. Defendants' motion to sup-
press evidence obtained pursuant to a se-
cret investigation in Emery County was 
also denied. The case was tried to a jury 
on July 18 through August 1, 1985, the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding. 
The jury found each defendant guilty of 
five counts of bribery and of all racketeer-
ing and antitrust counts. Motions for mis-
trial were denied. Thompson was sen-
tenced to serve notices than one nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
OookMn and Ziemski were each sentenced 
to serve one year in the Salt Lake County 
Jafl on work release. Each defendant was 
fined 125,000 far the antitrust violations. 
Bfcsed on the racketeering convictions, the 
court also ordered forfeiture of all business 
Interests of defendants in the guard compe-
ars Involved fa the ease. The sentences 
aB flayed pending appeal. 
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On appeal, defendant* challenge the jur-
isdiction of the trial court and the court's 
denial of their motion to suppress certain 
evidence. Defendants also challenge spe-
cific jury instructions, each of their convic-
tions, and the trial court's denial of their 
motion for a mistrial. 
Jurisdiction and Probable Cause for AT* 
rmi 
(1] Defendants first argue the affidavit 
upon which their arrest warrants were 
based failed to establish probable cause. 
The arrest warrants were therefore alleg-
edly invalid, and the trial court was de-
prived of Jurisdiction over defendants. The 
Utah Supreme Court has "rejected] the 
position that the probable cause require-
ment for arrest warrants is jurisdictional.'9 
State « Sekreuder, 712 ?2d 264, 272 
(Utah 1985). In Sekreuder, the defendant 
challenged her conviction on the ground 
that the statement presented in support of 
the arrest warrant failed to establish the 
requisite probable cause The Court, as-
suming lack of probable cause for the pur* 
poses of discussion, adopted the majority 
rule that an "Segal arrest or detention 
does not void a subsequent conviction." 
ML at 271 (quoting Gerttein % Pugh, 420 
U-S. l t t , 119, 96 &<X 864, 865-66, 43 
LXAM 64 (OT6)). The Court explained: 
f i l e ] probable cause requirement for an 
arrest warrant becomes moot bj the time 
a defendant has been convicted because 
the moch more stringent requirements of 
proof at trial have been employed tp pro* 
toct the defendant 
Q 2 P J d a * * f t In light of ScArwfrr, we 
hold defendants' challenge to the trial 
courts jurisdiction Is moot. 
AdmissOkHtg^Emdenm 
Defendants i t s * argue the trial court 
m i la daayfag thssr motto to suppress 
attain evidence. The instant ease began 
with M aecret fa?eet%etioei conducted in 
Emery County wdsr the authority ef 
Tadga/Boyd QBQMB, Seventh District 
Court* aod pursuant to Utah Code Annotat-
ed M TT-©-i through -4 (196% commoafy 
referred to aa ths Subpoena Power? Apt ar 
* s Utah MkMkwfi Jwy AA During 
Ihe sms^^lttsx fsjijUKiw athn aafrt e # 
poenas duces tecum to accumulate most of 
the evidence used at trial, including tax and 
bank records from defendants" accountants 
and banks. Upon a motion by defendants 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act, 
Judge Bunnell concluded the Act had been 
abused and was subject to continual abuse 
due to its broad terms and provisions. 
Judge Bunnell declared the Act unconstitu-
tional, dismissed the investigation, and 
quashed all outstanding subpoenas. The 
prosecution's appeal of that ruling is now 
pending before the Utah Supreme Court 
In ihe Matter of a Criminal Investiga-
tion, No. 20268 (Utah Wed Oct 25, 1984). 
Based on Judge Bunnell's ruling, defend-
ants fDed a motion to suppress all evidence 
seized pursuant to the investigation. After 
a hearing on December 27, 1984, Judge 
Billings held Judge Bunnell's ruling to be 
the law of the case. However, in a memo-
randum decision dated January 10, 1985, 
Judge Billings denied defendants' motion to 
suppress. TYie evidence was subsequently 
admitted to prove the substance of the 
Crimea charged. 
The basis for the trial court's denial of 
defendants' motion to suppress was as fol-
lows: 
The appropriate standard for suppression 
of the evidence acquired under the "Sub-
poena Powers Act" in this case requires 
that the defendants show, as the State 
contends, a "substantial violation" of de-
fendants' constitutional rights and that 
the violation was "not committed in good 
faith," aa required by Rule 12(g), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 77-
16-12(g)). Defendants have neither ac-
knowledged tiiis Rule, nor attempted to 
meet the required showing for suppres-
sion of evidence. 
On appeal, defendants daim the evidence 
to the instant case waa obtained without 
legal process and should therefore be sup-
pressed. Defendants contend the govern-
ment's actions were In violation of their 
individual rights to and expectations of pri» 
vucy. 
HJ The enforcement of a subpoena die-
ea tecum is subject to fourth siiumdin—t 
STATE v. FLETCHER 
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restriction! against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, although not to the extent of 
a search warrant Oklahoma Pre** Pub. 
Co. * Walling, 827 US 186, 66 S.Ct 494, 
80 LEd. 614 (1946). Defendants' claims to 
an expectation of privacy are rights pro-
tected under the fourth amendment Ba-
ku a Illinois 489 US 128, 99 S.Ct 421, 
68 LEA2d 887 (1978). Furthermore, 
*Xe]videnoe is suppressed or excluded only 
if the same was obtained by a riolation of 
the Fourth Amendment, designed to pro-
tect a person's right to privacy and proper-
ty." Stat* % Montoyn*, 18 Utah 2d 88,41, 
414 FM 968, 960 (1966). 
In United State* v. Leon, 468 U-S. 897, 
104 &Ct 8406, 82 LE<L2d 677 0984), the 
United States Supreme Court created the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule: where an officer acts in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently in-
validated warrant, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply. The Utah state legislature 
codified the Leon good faith exception in 
Utah Code Ann. | 77-85-18(g) (1982). As 
previously discussed, the trial court denied 
defendants' motion to suppress for failure 
to meet the requirements of section 77-86* 
life* 
However, the Utah Supreme Court re-
cently invalidated section 77-85-12(g). In 
Stat* si Mendorn, 748 PJd 181 (Utah 
1987), the Court rejected the prosecution's 
argument that the good faith exception 
should apply to an invalid, warrantless stop 
and search of a vehicle. H * Court ex-
plained that because "no outside authority 
on which the officers could reasonably rely 
expressly authorised the search . . . , the 
policy foundations of the Leon exception do 
tot appear fe searches of [this Und)." Id. 
sft l t t . Furthermore, section 77-8HKg) 
wept ooyonu me scope or me gooo num 
exception in requiting defendants to prove 
i substantial violation fcf their fourth 
amendment righta. Since section f7-J£-
12(g) purported to create a goon faith ax* 
dtoptioti tb an investigatory flop and search 
end because ft Improperly shifted the bu> 
den of pnm^ the Court fcstnd the statuts 
violated the fssorth amendment of the Unit* 
ed States 
Although section 77-85-12(g) is now in-
valid, the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule under L*on is still valid. 
Defendants argue the good faith excep-
tion applicable to search warrants does not 
apply to the execution of subpoenas issued 
pursuant to a statute subsequently de-
clared unconstitutional. This position is 
contrary to Illinois v. Krull, — U.S. , 
107 S.Ct 1160, 94 LEd.2d 864 (1987). In 
Krull, the Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule should be recog-
nized when officers act in objectively rea-
sonable reliance upon a statute authorizing 
warrantless administrative searches where 
the statute is ultimately found to be uncon-
stitutional. An Illinois statute permitted 
government officers to conduct warrant-
less searches of the records of dealers in 
automobiles and automobile parts. Such a 
search showed Krull to be in possession of 
stolen automobiles. Subsequent to the 
search, a federal court in an unrelated mat-
ter held the Illinois law to be unconstitu-
tionally broad. Upon motion by defendant, 
the trial court suppressed the evidence 
based on the federal court ruling. The 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting 
the state's good faith exception argument 
The United States Supreme Court re-
versed. The Court explained the good 
faith exception was established because the 
deterrent effect and remedial purpose of 
the exclusionary rule are not served where 
an officer acts in objectively reasonable 
reBance on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate. Likewise, the Court 
held, "if [a] statute is subsequently de-
clared unconstitutional, excluding evidence 
obtained pursuant to It prior to such a 
judicial declaration wiD not deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer 
who has simply fulfilled his responsibility 
to esfotte the statate aa written.9' ML 107 
a O t at 1167 In Mendoea, the Utah Su-
preme Court ntted, "Krnll does not affect 
nor characterisation of Leon* In both 
cease, the officers conducting the searches 
dU so in eBJectively reasonable mttanee on 
prior, external authorisation." f«8PJ*at 
1 8 6 * 8 . likewise, In the instantjaae, the 
m 
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objectively reasonable reliance on prior, ex-
ternal authorisation. 
[ t ] 'Thif Court may affirm a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence on any 
proper ground, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling. 
State * Barber, 747 P.2d 436 (Utah App. 
1987). Regardless of the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court on the constitutionali-
ty of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury Act, we 
hold the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
subpoenas duces tecum was admissible un-
der the principle set forth in KrulL The 
trial court's denial of defendants' motion to 
eupptcps is affirmed. 
Antitrust and "Group Boycott" 
Defendants contend they were improper-
ly charged with and convicted of conduct in 
vtoetfte of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah 
Godtjknn. H T M 0 4 U through -926 
(1979)£ IWs is the first criminal prosecu-
tion tider the Utah Antitrust Act and is 
thus'a case of first impression. T^e gener-
al provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act are 
simflaf in many respects to their federal 
counterparts in the Sherman Act, 15U.S.C. 
H 1 through 7 (1987). Section 79-10-926 
provides, *T^e legislature intends that the 
court*; in construing this act, wfD be guid-
ed by "interpretations given by the federal 
courts to comparable federal antitrust stat-
utes ghd by other state courts to compara-
ble state antitrust statutes." 
Sec&ou 76-10-9140) of the Utah Anti-
trust Act, fike section 1 of the Sherman 
Act ntatae, "Every contract, combination 
la thf form tt trust or otherwise, or eon-
flpiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is 
declared to be IDegaL* Section 76-10-920 
pftum piovioss. 
^lay,person who violates taction 76-10-
f }4 by prioe fixing, bid rigging, agreeing 
mnfng competitors to divide customers 
ar^^rritories. or by engaging b a group 
boycott with spedfic intent of eHmtnat* 
h g competition shaD be punished, If an 
individual by a fine not to exceed $G0r 
990 or by imprisonment for an indeter-
minate time not to exceed one year, or 
fro* «r, If by # person nth* thaa an 
U M d a a l 9 fim net » ancead $199,990. 
Defendants point out there are three ele-
ments to the offense charged in the instant 
case: (A) a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade in violation of 
section 70-10-914; (B) in the form of a 
group boycott; and (Q with specific intent 
to eliminate competition. 
(A) 
Defendants argue federal courts uni-
formly have refused to find commercial 
bribery to be a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act Commercial bribery is de-
fined in Utah Code Ann. f 76-6-«08(b) 
(1978) as follows: 
A person . . . without the consent of the 
employer or principal, contrary Co the 
interests of the employer or principal . . . 
confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon 
the employee, agent, or fiduciary of an 
employer or principal any benefit with 
the purpose of influencing the conduct of 
the employee, agent, or fiduciary in relatr 
ing to his employer's or principal's af-
In United State* t. Boeton and Maine 
Railroad, 880 U.S. 167, 162, 85 S.Ct 868, 
871, 18 LEd.2d 728 (1965), the United 
States Supreme Court held, "[I]t is doubt-
ful that this indictment . . . alleges any-
thing more in substance than a bribe. 
Bribery might well be in the family of 
offenses covered under a conflict of inter-
eat statute. But it is more remote from an 
antitrust frame of reference." In Calnet-
iee Corp. «. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
582 PJd 974 987 (9th Or.1976), cert de-
nied, 429 VS. 940,97 S.Ct 855, 50 LEd.2d 
909 (1976), the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held, *tQ]ommercial bribery, standing 
alone, does not constitute a violation of the 
Sherman Act" And in Municipality of 
Anchorage % Hitachi Cable, l*L, 647 
F5upp 688,646 (D Alaska 1982), the court 
held, Commercial bribery does not in itself 
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act" 
WhOe it is true that commercial bribery 
alone is not conduct in violation of federal 
antitrust law, Twjben the bribery is cou-
pled with otifcr acta tending to restrain 
trade, a data under the Sherman Act may 
STATE v. 
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be established." Hitachi. 647 F-Supp. at 
646; see aUo Associated Radio Sere. Co. 
* Page Airway* Inc., 824 F.2d 1S42 (6th 
Qr.lttO). In the cases cited by defend-
ants, there was no evidence of any affirma-
tive acts, coupled with the bribery, to re-
strain trade. In the instant case, however, 
the prosecution presented substantial evi-
dence of other affirmative acts in restraint 
of trade, e.g., Fletcher's refusal to accept 
proposals from other security guard com-
14] The dissent suggests that, under 
the majority opinion's view, every commer-
cial bribery in which the payee performs 
his end of the bargain would be an anti-
trust violation. Such is not the case. Com-
mercial bribes paid to an employee, agent, 
or fiduciary of UP A L could be for other 
purposes, including rate adjustments, waiv-
ar of service fees, and waiver of safety 
requirements. Such purposes are dearly 
not in restraint of trade or anticompetitive. 
Furthermore, had defendants paid Fletcher 
the bribes in order to influence him to deal 
exclusively with them only after he had 
received other bids, their actions arguably 
would not have been a conspiracy entered 
into primarily to eliminate competition or 
restrain trade. However, b the instant 
ease, the primary purpose of the bribes 
was to restrain trade by eliminating all 
competition for the UP 4 L security eon-
tract The first element of the offense was 
therefore Established. 
(B) 
Defendants next argue their alleged 
agreement with Fletcher did not constitute 
a group boycott, and, therefore, the prose-
cution failed to estabikh the second ele-
ment of the offense. Federal courts have 
long held that whether a particular action 
or agreement violates the 8berman Act de-
pends oo whether It is an unreasonable 
restraint <* trade Board qf Trade pf City 
if Chicago * United Stat** 246 U A 281, 
18 S.Ot £42, tt LEd. Ctt (1818), to CW-
« * » Board of Trad* the United States 
Supreme pomt established the "rale of 
Itasot" standard to determine whether a 
FLETCHER Utah 811 
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To determine that question the court 
must ordinarily consider the facts pecu-
liar to the business to which the restraint 
b applied; its condition before and after 
the restraint was imposed; the nature of 
the restraint, and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, 
the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are all 
relevant facts. This is not because a 
good intention will save an otherwise ob-
jectionable regulation, or the reverse; 
but because knowledge of intent may 
help the court to interpret facts and to 
predict consequences. 
Id at 238, 88 S.Ct at 244. In other words, 
"the factfinder [must] decide whether un-
der all the circumstances of the case the 
restrictive practice imposes an unreason-
able restraint on competition." Arizona * 
Maricopa County Med Sot, 457 VS 882, 
843, 102 S.Ct 2466, 2472, 73 LJft2d 48 
(1W2). 
While federal courts have utilised the 
rule of reason in determining the legality 
of most restraints alleged to be in violation 
of the Sherman Act, they have also, by 
experience, been able to categorize certain 
business practices or relationships as per 
ae unreasonable. In Northern Pacific 
Railway Co. v. United State* 856 U.S. 1, 
6, 78 S.Ct 514, 618, 2 LEd.2d 545 (1»58), 
the United States Supreme Court held, 
"XTJhere are certain agreements or practic-
es which because of their pernicious effect 
on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable and therefore Illegal without 
elaborate inquiry aa to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse 
for their use." These per se practices in-
clude price fixing, division of markets, 
group boycotts, and tying arrangements. 
Id Recognition of the per se rule obviates 
the costly and complex litigation a complete 
role of reason inquiry entails. At; me also 
Northwest Wholesale Stationer* Inc. % 
Pacific Stationery and Printing Cat 472 
U-S. 284, 1P4 S.Ct 2613, 8$ LEdJd 802 
(1885). 
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III Although there » a "marked lack of 
uniformity"f among the federal courta in 
defining the term group boycott, a elaatic 
per ae group boycott exists where two or 
more competitors on the same level of the 
market structure agree to eliminate a tar-
get horixontal competitor by combining to 
deny the target of elements needed in or-
der to compete. Federal Maritime 
Common % Aktiebolaget Svenska Ameri-
ka Unien, 890 U-S. 238, 250, 88 S.CL 1005, 
101% 19 U3cL2d 1071 (1968); United 
State* * General Motor* Corp., 884 U.S. 
127,140,86 S.CL 1821,1827-28,16 LEd.2d 
415 (1966); Klor% Inc. % Broadway-Hale 
Store*, /*&, 859 VS. 207,212,79 S.Ct 705, 
709, t LJA2d 741 (1959). See also L 
SuHivan, Handbook of the Law of Anti-
trust 280 (1977). The restraining agree-
ment need not "entirely exclude its victims 
from the market," but only "[prevent 
them] from making free choices between 
market alternatives...." Associated Gen. 
Contractor* ef California, Inc. si Califor-
nia State Council of Carpenter*, 459 VS. 
519, 528,10S S.CL 897,90S, 74 LE<L2d 728 
(1988). It is the horixontal effect of a 
group boycott, a "naked [restraint] of trade 
with no purpose except stifling of competi-
tion,9' which typically warrants application 
of per ae illegality. White Motor Co v. 
United State*. 872 VS. 258, 268, 88 SCt 
696, 702, 9 UE&2d 788 0963). 
Vertical nonprice restraints, Le., combi-
nations of persons at different levels of the 
market structure, are generally not treated 
under the per ae doctrine but are examined 
under the jrule of reason standard. Conti-
nental I K , Inc. % GTE Sylvania /»&, 
488 VS. 86, 97 &Ct 2549, 53 LEdL2d 568 
0977). As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained: 
We do not know enough of the economic 
and business stuff out of which these 
arrangements emerge to. be certain. 
U*y may be too dangerous to sanction 
or they may be allowable protections 
* J W J t r v * I f i v f i « * K € k « A*v*438 
41* Sit, Ml* 96 *CL &2X 2930, 57 LfidJd 
1SUI7D. 
8. Uc***rm*&*$U*mmAam<*V*kA**r 
m * Act 'sttcapts la provide both tfct ptsssss 
against aggressive competitors or the 
only practicable means a small company 
has for breaking into or staying in busi-
ness and within the "rule of reason." 
We need to know more than we do about 
the actual impact of these arrangements 
on competition to decide whether they 
have such a "pernicious effect on compe-
tition and lack . . . any redeeming vir-
tue/' 
White Motor Co^ VIZ VS. at 263, 83 S.Ct 
at 702 (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 UJ5. 
at 5,78 S.Ct at 518) (citations omitted). In 
Continental T.V., the Court further ex-
plains that whQe "[v]ertical restrictions re-
duce intrabrand competition by limiting the 
number of sellers of a particular product 
competing for the business of a given 
group of buyers . . . , [they also] promote 
interbrand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficien-
cies in the distribution of his products." 
483 VS. at 54, 97 S.Ct at 2560. 
Under the Sherman Act, both classic 
group boycotts and vertical restraints de-
termined unreasonable are subject to crimi-
nal penalties. Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act provides: 
Every person who shall make any eon-
tract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by fine not exceeding one million dollars 
if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
one hundred thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discre-
tion of the court 
16] Section 76-10-920 of the Utah Anti-
trust Act, however, criminalises only the 
four types of conduct that have been clear 
\j labeled as per se violations of the Sher-
man Act1 The rale of reason analysis has 
no part in the criminal provisions of the 
Utah Antitrust Act Therefore, unless de-
fendants9 conduct was in the form of a 
lor and the community si terse wfeh s dear 
definition of whst nMHfr— Is rriminslrj pro-
scribed." S.lXbbU*S.)*niiix,Th*UMhAnh 
mat Ad *f 1979: Get*** boo The SUM Amxi 
Ww* Bkutntm. 1990 Uu* Clev. TS. 83. 
STATE •. 
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group boycott; it was not criminal under 
Utah law. 
"The instant case it not a classic group 
boycott Tht prosecution claims this is an 
arrangement between a group of horizontal 
competitors, Le., tbe three defendants. At 
DO time, however, did any two of defend-
ants co-exist as competitors. Rather, they 
were successive owners of the same securi-
ty guard company, albeit the company had 
different names under different owners. 
Therefore, the alleged agreement between 
defendants and Fletcher did not constitute 
a classic group boycott under the federal 
definition. 
However, the group boycott specified in 
section 76-10-920 is not the classic group 
boycott recognized by federal courts. Un-
der the classic (per se) group boycott defini-
tion, proof of intent and/or effect is not 
required, but it is conclusively presumed 
tbe boycott is anticompetitive and in viola-
tion of antitrust laws. Northern Pacific, 
856 VS. at 6, 78 S.Ot at 518. Under 
section 76-10-920, tbe prosecution is re-
quired ID prove a defendant engaged in a 
group boycott "with [the] specific intent 
ofeliminating competition." When inter-
preting a statute, we assume the legisla-
ture used each term advisedly and in its 
proper sense. Home v. Borne, 787 P2d 
144, 847 (Utah App.1987); State * Fmnk-
**, 786 PJU 84, 87 (Utah 1887). We con-
strue the statute "on the assumption . . . 
that the intent of the Legislature is re* 
vealed ia the use ef the term in the context 
syrf s t r e a m which Misplaced." Ward 
ft Sic\/UU OU* 714 PJd 266, 866 (Utah 
1864). Btj rsquiring a separate element of 
*frpactfk Jntent of shmmating competition," 
the kgklature dearly did not adopt the 
daaaic group boycott definition formulated 
tv the federal coota. 
If 1 the tana grovp boycott a* used by 
Iks Utah state legislature mors closely re-
sembles ttte general defmhioa of boycott 
*fc Nthsd t f pressuring a party with 
whet* cos has a dispute by withholding, or 
others to withhold, patronage or 
frwathstarfst" SLPnutnre* 
Asa €k a Jbrvft OB U A 681, 
SO, 68 l O t 6888. 8868, i t LMUi 868 
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(1978). In the instant case, defendants, 
through bribes, enlisted Fletcher to refuse 
any bids from their competitors, the tar-
gets of the boycott A group boycott un-
der the Utah Antitrust Act requires at 
least two conspirators, but neither the 
number of boycotters nor their market re-
lationship with the target is determinative 
of criminal liability. Rather, the intent of 
the contract, combination, or conspiracy is 
tbe deciding element 
The dissent proposes an alternative inter-
pretation of section 76-10-920, suggesting 
the specific anticompetitive intent element 
is intended to narrow the scope of the 
federal definition of a classic group boy-
cott The dissent also suggests the majori-
ty opinion fails to consider the anticompeti-
tive effect of defendants9 actions in the 
relevant marketplace. In essence, the dis-
sent suggests we adopt the classic per se 
definition of group boycott but that we use 
the rule of reason in evaluating the ele-
ments of proof. Federal courts have con-
sistently held that classic group boycotts 
include, by definition, the elements of anti-
competitive intent and effect in the rele-
vant marketplace. Sec National Collegi-
ate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of 
Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 108-104, 
104 S.Ct 2948, 2961, 82 LEdAi 70 (1984) 
C'Per se rules are invoked when surround-
ing circumstances make the likelihood of 
anticompetitive conduct so great as to ren-
der unjustified further examination of the 
challenged conduct"). It makes no sense 
to adopt tbe daaaic per se definition of 
group boycott and then to require proof of 
anticompetitive intent and market effect 
We therefore cannot accept the dissent's 
interpretation of section 76-10-820. 
I8J Our interpretation of the Utah Anti-
trust Act is in line with a current trend in 
federal case law to focus not on the form 
of the conspiracy, but on the intent of the 
conspirators. Ia Continental T.VH the 
United States Supreme Court, after estab-
lishing the rule of reason analysis aa the 
general standard for vertical restraints, 
stated "we do not foreclose tbe possibility 
that particular applications ff vertical re-
strictions might justify jwrr #t iroybWotL" 
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483 UA at 68, 97 S.CL at 2SS2. Increas-
ingly, federal courtt are recognizing per ae 
group boycotts between a single horizontal 
competitor and a vertically related compa-
ny. See Cascade Cabinet Co. * Western 
Cabinet and Millwork, 710 FM 1866 (9th 
Gr.1983); Corn-Tel, Inc. * DuKdne Corp., 
669 F id 404 (6th Cir.1982); Corey % Look, 
641 ¥M 82 (1st Or.1981). Sec alec Sulli-
van, Antitrust, at 281 n. 1; Decker, The 
Numeroeity Requirement For Group 
Boycott* Toward a Horizontal Benefit 
Analysis, 18 U£.F.LRev. 677 (1984); 
Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Re-
fusals to Deal- A Rule Ripe for Reexami-
nation. 79 ColumXJtev. 689 (1979). Ttxae 
cases and commentators urge that when 
applying the per se rule to a group boycott, 
the key inquiries should not be the number 
or nature of the conspirators, but their 
intent and/or the effect of the restraint on 
competition. No logic supports ignoring 
defendants' anticompetitive conduct in the 
instant case solely because they failed to 
recruit a second horizontal competitor into 
their conspiracy. See Decker, The Numer* 
oeity Requirement, 18 U&F.LRev. at 687 
CW * single firm has the necessary influ-
ence to effectuate an exclusionary boycott 
with a supplier or customer, such conduct 
should not escape the per ee rule simply 
because that firm did not combine with 
Others at its own market level to exert its 
influence."). Although the coercive pres-
sure was applied vertically, the stifling of 
competition was borixontaL Corn-Tel, 
/*&, 669 PJd at 409. A conspiracy b the 
form of a froup boycott was therefore 
rtabGebed. 
(C) 
(9,111 Under our interpretation of sec-
* M 76-10-914 and -920, therefore, the 
group boycott involving defendants and 
^^stcnor V^ OIUQ no criminal anon a nroner 
atoning of a tptrfffc intent to *»-**-«*» 
competition. When the specific intewt of a 
defendant k an clems* of the criminal 
offense cfcarged, the intent auiy be Inferred 
from the defendant; s conduct and anr-
roundbg cbtnmstaneee. Stale * Fowler, 
746PJd472,476(Utah App.l987k State*. 
Kenned* Hi PJd 0M, MjWtob 1 M * 
In the instant case, not one of the contracts 
between UP & L and defendants was com-
petitively bid. Representatives of other 
large companies testified the usual course 
of action when selecting a security guard 
company is open bidding. Several repre-
sentatives of other security guard compa-
nies testified their attempts to submit bid 
proposals to Fletcher were either refused 
or ignored. Sufficient evidence wss 
presented to the jury to infer s specific 
intent of eliminating competition on the 
part of defendants. The third element of 
the offense was clearly established. 
We bold defendants were properly 
charged with engaging in a criminal group 
boycott under sections 76-10-914 and -920. 
Under our interpretation of the Utah Anti-
trust Act, an individual is clearly on notice 
that if he (or she) engages in a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade, with the specific intent of eliminat-
ing competition, regardless of who his co-
conspirators are, be will be criminally bar 
We. 
Because there is some evidence, includ-
ing reasonable inferences, to support every 
element of the jury's verdict, we will not 
disturb it on appeal. State v. Garcia, 744 
PJd 1029 (Utah App.1987). Defendants' 
convictions on the antitrust counts are af-
firmed. 
Racketeering and "Pattern" of Activity 
Defendants argue they were improperly 
charged with and convicted of conduct in 
violation of the Utah Racketeering Influ-
ences and Criminal Enterprise Act, Utah 
Code Ann. H 76-KMC01 through -1606 
0961) (the RICE Act). When this case was 
tried, section 76-10-1908(1) provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who 
has received any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a 
pattern of racketeering activity in which 
such person has participated, aa a princi-
pal, to nee or invest, directly or indirect-
ly, any part of such proceeds, or the 
proceeds derived from the investment or 
use thereof, in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion e l any enterprise 
STATE r. FLETCHER Utah 8 1 5 
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A "pattern of racketeering activity" was vague. Vagueness it a question of proce-
defined in aection 76-10-1602(4) M: dur»j due process, namely "whether the 
engaging b at least two episode* of statute adequately notices the proscribed 
racketeering conduct which have the con<jUct." State ». Frampton, 787 P.2d 
same or similar objectives, results, par- 18a, 192 (Utah 1987). Defendants claim 
tkipanta, victims, or methods of oommis- wi'U,out requiring that the conduct pro-
sion. or are otherwise interrelated by dis- scribed demonstrate characteristics tradi-
tinguishing characteristics and are not tioudiy associated with organized crime, 
isolated events, provided at least one of the RICE Act does not specifically define 
such episodes occurred after the effec- for persons of ordinary intelligence the out-
live date of this part and the last of er perimeter of acceptable conduct State 
which occurred within five years after 9. Ovens, 688 P.2d 1182,1183 (Utah 1981). 
the commission of a prior episode of T *
 R I C E A c t proscribes the use of pro-
racketeering conduct* ceefe derived from a pattern of racketeer-
Violation of the RICE Act is a second de- ing activity in an enterprise. Under the 
gree felony punishable by op to 16 years statute, "enterprise," "racketeering actrri-
imprisooment, a fine of $10,000, and forfei- ty,* ^ d "pattern of racketeering activity" 
tore of all jwoperfcr associated with the are ^j dearij defined. "Episode" is de-
racketeering enterprise. fined in Utah Code Ann. ( 76-1-401 (1978). 
Defendants first contend the RICE Act, W e hold that the RICE Act is "sufficiently 
patterned after the federal Racketeer la-' e l i c i t to inform the ordinary reader what 
flaenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 CODth>ct « prohibited," and is therefore not 
U.S.C. H 1961 through 1968 (1984) (the unconstitutionally vague. StaU v. Tkeo-
RICO Act), was enacted to prevent the ***% 646 P2A 60, 61 (Utah 1982). 
•filtration of organised crime into Utah. Under section 76-10-1602(l)(h), bribery 
Therefore, defendants argue, the RICE Act was included as an act of racketeering, 
should extend only to ease* involving of- sometimes referred to as a predicate act* 
fosses committed by organised crime. Defendants argue that using commercial 
t i l ) Although tfte legislative histories ^"^ery, a class B misdemeanor punishable 
of both the RICE and RICO Acta suggest h7 *p to six months in jail and a fine of up 
they were intended to apply to persons to 1299, to satisfy the RICE Act require-
eagaged ss acts traditionally associated toSM of predicate offenses violates the eon-
with organised crime, a nexus to organised stit^tional restraint against disproportion-
crime was not fadoded as an element of *te punishment In reviewing a daim of 
the offense. Tbe United 8tates Supreme disproportionate punishment the question 
Court concluded that the RICO Act apphas » Nrhether the sentence imposed in pro-
to "aay person" who engages ia eooduet portion to the offense committed is such as 
flat Act forbids. SeOma, &PJLL «. /as- to shock the moral sense of aD reasonable 
MC Co, #**, *78 UA. 479, 106 8-Ct 8276, men, as to what » right and proper under 
8286, 87 Ll&2d 846 (1*85). Simfiariy, we the
 ettTamataiMea.M StaU v. Hanson, 627 
hold Utah's RICE Act is not Bnrftod ID P-ty 58, 66 (Utah 1981) (quoting StaU v. 
application to person afffieted with org*- Na*u$, 20 Utah 2d 872, 4S8 PJd 642, 644 
assedcrisa*. <««8)). 
I l l ] D*feodants eootend that not feahV (If) Defendants' argument ignores the 
ing app&atioa of the RICE Act to serious additional elements required under the 
and aggravated offenses by organised I I C E Act, Le, a pattern of racketeering 
crime renders the Act ancoostitationally activity, existence of an enterprise, and ase 
* Utm,^tjmyt/$htjdt sAsjastjsBv r» 1 W « U l « « 7 revwJoa. sxtJoa M-10-IM2 
i f f i t r v T ^ i ^ r *?n?^ H^Jr^?? **• *"•» * e »«v«ral statutory Qrpcs of bribery 
J!.*£!?*H1**'.y . *y ?*?r *** sMh4duaB>. tedudiag comment bribery ssv 
y ^ r T s ^ i C Z e s T ^ l ™ 1 ™ acawt- 4%«ctte«ffS Ml. 
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of proceeds derived from the racketeering 
activity to establish, acquire, or operate the 
enterprise. Defendants claim these ele-
ments are illusory. We disagree. It is not 
the commercial briberies that are being 
punished in the present case, but the broad-
er conduct which is forbidden by the RICE 
Act Qf. United Stat* % Field, 482 
F.Supp. 56 (S.DJt.Y.1977), qffd 578 FAI 
1871 (2nd Gr.1978), Ctrl dismissed, 489 
VS. 801, 99 S.Ct 48, 58 LEd.2d 94 (1978) 
(Congress entitled to make pattern of rack-
eteering an independent criminal offense 
punishable more severely than simply twice 
the penalty for each constituent offense). 
We do not find defendants9 sentences for 
the RICE violations unconstitutionally 
"shoeing." 
Defendants also argue the use of misde-
meanors as predicate acts under the RICE 
Act k inconsistent with Utah's habitual 
criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. 
| 76-&-1001 0978), and the enhancement 
prorooii of the Utah Controlled Sub-
stances Act, Utah Code Ann. 
| 58^7-^UXbXiiD 0987). Under section 
76-8-1001, upon proof that a person has 
been twice convicted, sentenced, and com-
mitted for a felony, one of which is at least 
of the second degree, the person may be 
sentenced as a habitual criminal for a peri-
od of five years to Mfe. Under section 
6^S7-80XbXm), upon a second conviction 
for production or distribution of a eon-
trolled substance, a class A misdemeanor, a 
parson is guilty of a third degree felony. 
114] The RICE Act is not inconsistent 
wftfe these criminal provisions. The RICE 
Act does not simply punish multiple viohv 
t , i f VSJL | 1*1(5) defines -pattern of rack* 
leering activity* as *m least two ecu of racks-
leering actfvto....* This definition has bssn 
Ihc subject of considerable Judicial attention 
foOowtagthe landmark United States Supreme 
Court dedsioa in S a t o * &PJLL * Imnx Ga, 
* ^ 473 U * 479, tOSSXt 1273, *7LAUd*44 
(1905). la fas now famous footnote 14, the 
Court noted the fact of mdftdty la the federal 
definition «* pattern ef racketeering activity. 
After a brief dbcussion of ingestions fta Ike 
Isgirfcrln kblorythat'Wicni" connotes Toonti-
tions of statutes prohibiting the acts enu-
merated in section 76-10-1602(1). Instead, 
the RICE Act punishes participation in a 
pattern of racketeering activity bearing the 
required relationship to an enterprise. See 
subsections 76-10-1603(1) through (4). 
Finally, defendants argue the evidence at 
trial failed to establish a pattern of racke-
teering activity. "Pattern of racketeering 
activity" was defined in section 76-10-
1602(4) as "at least two episodes of racke-
teering conduct which have the same or 
similar objectives, results, participants, vic-
tims, or methods of commission, or are 
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated 
events " Defendants claim the several 
counts of bribery of which they were con-
victed were, as a matter of law, part of 
only a single episode of racketeering con-
duct and thus cannot establish a pattern. 
In support of their argument, defendants 
cite several federal cases involving civil 
claims under the RICO Act The federal 
definition of a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity differs significantly from the defini-
tion of the aame term in section 76-10-
1602(4).' Federal cases which elaborate on 
the federal definition of "pattern of racke-
teering activity** are, however, helpful in 
our analysis. 
Federal case law after Sedima has at-
tempted judicially to refine the definition of 
"pattern of racketeering activity" of the 
RICO Act Those cases have emphaaized 
the concepts of "continuity plus related-
neea** discussed in Sedimci Against this 
backdrop, some federal courts have fash-
ioned requirements that there be "multiple 
enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pat-
tern If h embraces criminal acts that have the 
esmc or similar purposes* results, parbri-
pants* victim*, or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not Isolated events." 
II V&JC | 1575(e). This language stay be 
useful la interpreting other sections of the 
Act 
105 &Ct at 5215. The pattern definition noted 
by the Supreme Court is substantislly identical 
lo the definition contained in the MCE Act 
Thus* the pattern analysis under the RICE Act 
docs not opgate from the same sparse ianguajt 
af the RICO Act 
STATE v 
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schemes" or "multiple criminal episodes" 
rather than aeverml acts to accomplish a 
tingle criminal objective in order to estab-
lish a pattern of racketeering activity. 
The case of Torwest DfiC, Inc. v. Dick, 
628 RSupp 16S (D.Cok>.1986), cited by de-
fendants, alleged multiple acts of mail/wire 
fraud in connection with a single scheme to 
defraud The district court held that no 
pattern existed where the defendants' con-
duct had a single purpose, a tingle result, 
one set of participants, a single victim, and 
ooe method of commission. The district 
court thus concluded there was "no conti-
nuity and, therefore, no pattern of racke-
teering activity." Id. at 166. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but dif-
ferentiated the case from one where "the 
RICO claim is based on one scheme involv-
ing ooe victim, but the plan contemplates 
open-ended fraudulent activity and does not 
have a single goal that, when achieved, will 
bring the activity to an end" Torwest 
DBQ Inc. w. Dick, 810 ?M 925, 929 (10th 
Or.1967). Other federal courts have noted 
that an ongoing scheme involving the same 
perpetrators, victims, and method of com-
mission may in itself demonstrate a suffi-
cient pattern of racketeering activity. See 
Thompson * Wyoming Alaska, Inc., 652 
PAipp. 1222,1227-28 (D.Utah 1987); Tem-
poraries, Inc. 9. Maryland National 
Bank. C88 FSupp. 118, 128 (D.Mdl966) 
("A more flexible and accurate approach to 
identifying patterns may be to require ei-
ther 1) more than ooe scheme or 2) an 
open-ended continuous scheme which eon-
tains a muhiplidty of predicate acta."). 
[ 1 M Q We conclude the RICE Act's 
definition of pattern requires separate but 
related criminal eptsodee as the bask for a 
patten. We also conclude that the facts of 
the (Bate before us satisfy the requirement 
of separate but related criminal episodes 
suggested by (he federal cases and implicit 
fe thf dfffaftfrn of pattwa ef farfcftmfag 
activity contained b section 7040-1«02(4). 
Defendants were each charged with seven 
Afferent bribes paid in approximately two 
Wfek intervale between February and May 
Sftt. Aa episode to * s V < * ***** TO-
IrdOl aa <W conduct wtuch to doecty relet 
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ed in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal ob-
jective." The trial court instructed the 
Jury as follows: 
If you should find one or more of the 
defendants guilty of bribery, you must 
then determine whether the seven identi-
fied payments constitute seven separate 
bribes, or a series of payments on a 
single bribe. If you find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that each of the payments 
was made with a distinct and separate 
purpose, then there are separate bribes. 
On the other hand, if the evidence does 
not convince you beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the payments were made with 
different purposes, then such payments 
constitute one bribe. 
Defendants argue the seven payments 
were in furtherance of a single criminal 
objective and therefore constituted a single 
episode. Determining the existence of a 
single offense or multiple offenses is a 
question of intent to be determined by the 
particular facts and circumstances of each 
case State v. KimbeU 620 P-2d 615, 518 
(Utah 1980). Although the overall scheme 
was to maintain defendants9 exclusive con-
tract with UP k L, there was evidence to 
support the jury's finding a separate pur-
pose for each bribe, Le., Fletcher's hiring of 
defendants' company before execution of a 
contract, his recommendations to UP k L 
management, and his refusal to consider 
other bids. The fact the jury convicted 
defendants on only five of the seven brib-
ery counts indicates they considered the 
facts and circumstances of each payment 
individually and made a determination as to 
each. As there to evidence to support the 
jury's findings, we will not disturb them on 
appeal Garcia, 744 PM at 1090. 
Defendants* convictions of violations of 
the RICE Act are affirmed. 
MiMOcllanoous Imum 
Defendants also argue their bribery con-
victions should be reversed because the 
trial court erred in not instructing the jury 
that aa Blegal bribe must be paid with 
criminal intent Die trial cou/t instructed 
the JuQr as follows: 
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Before you can convict any defendant for 
bribery you mutt find beyond a reason-
able doubt each and every one of the 
following elements: 
(1) That the defendant or defendants in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
(2) On or about the date or dates alleged 
in the Information; 
(8) That the defendant or defendants 
conferred, offered or agreed to confer 
upon L Brent Fletcher a benefit; 
(4) That this benefit was conferred or 
offered with the purpose of influencing 
the conduct of Mr. Fletcher in relating to 
the affairs of Utah Power and light 
contrary to the interest* of Utah Power 
and Light and without its consent; 
(6) That the defendant or defendants of-
fered or conferred or agreed to confer 
the benefits, if any, knowingly, intention-
ally or willfully as those terms are de-
fined in these instructions. 
117] We believe the instruction suffi-
ciently advised the jury on the law. Both 
the statute and the instruction implicitly 
require a criminal intent by requiring a 
showing of conduct contrary to the inter* 
eats of and without the consent of the 
employer or principal. See State v. 
OWeiH 108 Washed 853, 700 P.2d 711 
(1985). Defendants' convictions of bribery 
are affirmed. 
Defendants next argue the trial court 
made prejudicial errors in the admission of 
certain evidence. Even assnming the trial 
court did err9 defendants have failed to 
show the challenged evidence had a sub-
stantial influence in bringing about the ver-
dict. Therefore* the errors, if any, wire 
not prejudicial. Utah RXvid. 108; State * 
Velarde, T84 PAI 440, 448 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, defendants argue the trial count 
erred fe not granting a mistrial after two 
witnesses mentioned the Fletcher trial and 
one juror told the court she had read of 
Fletcher's conviction h the newspaper dur-
ing the trial Wkh regard to motions for 
mistrial theUt*h Supreme Court has statr 
The critical inquiry should be whether 
there is a reasonable UkeBhood that the 
faddent so prejudiced the jury that fa Its 
absence there might have been a differ-
ent result Due to his advantaged posi-
tion and consistent with his responsibili-
ties as the authority in charge of the 
trial, the inquiry is necessarily addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court 
He should view such an episode in the 
light of the total proceeding, and if he 
thinks that there has been such prejudice 
that there is a reasonable probability 
that the defendant cannot have a fair and 
impartial determination of his guilt or 
innocence, he should of course grant a 
mistrial. But inasmuch as this is his 
primary responsibility, when he has giv-
en due consideration and ruled upon the 
matter, this court on review should not 
upset his ruling unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion. 
State v. Hodges, 80 Utah 2d 867, 517 P.2d 
1822, 1824 (1974) (footnote omitted). 
[18] Defendants have failed to show 
any clear abuse of the trial court's discre-
tion. The trial court and counsel both 
questioned the juror. The juror indicated 
the fact of Fletcher's conviction had no 
impact on her deliberation* and was not 
discussed with the other jury members. 
Furthermore, the trial court adequately in-
structed the jury to only consider the evi-
dence introduced at trial. The denial of 
defendants9 motion for a mistrial is af-
firmed. 
The jury verdict on all counts is af-
firmed. 
DAVIDSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting in part): 
While I otherwise fully concur m the 
majority opinion, I disagree with the result 
reached and portions of the analysis in the 
section entitled "Antitrust and 'Group Boy-
GOVT. 
As the majority states, there are three 
elements of the antitrust offense as 
charged in this case: (1) a contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy tn restraint of trade; 
(2) in the form of a group boycott; and (8) 
with specific intent to eliminate competi-
tion. I sfanply do not believe that these 
elements have been met Ifytifeagreement 
STATE v, 
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with my colleagues » quite complete. I 
believe defendant!9 conduct constituted 
simple commercial bribery. I believe their 
conduct can in no way be properly charac-
terized as a group boycott I believe the 
evidence shows defendants' intent was 
strictly to line their own pockets and not, in 
any sense, to eliminate competition. 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 
I do not view Utah's antitrust statute as 
the appropriate vehicle for bringing com-
mercial bribery charges* In addressing 
this issue, the trial court properly recog-
nized the Robinson-Patman Act as the ve-
hicle under which federal commercial brib-
ery charges are typically brought1 The 
court interpreted the Legislature's failure 
to incorporate a Robinson-Patman Act as 
evidencing an intent to make Utah's anti-
trust statute the appropriate vehicle for 
charging commercial bribery. I believe the 
fairer interpretation m that the Legislature 
deliberately faOed to incorporate tike Robin-
soo-Pstman-type act into our antitrust statr 
vie because it recognized that Utah already 
has a specific vehicle for prosecuting com-
mercial bribery, namely the commercial 
bribery statute. Utah Code Ann. 
| Tfr4~fi08 (Wty. 
Even assuming that commercial bribery 
is properly charged under the Utah anti-
trust statute, the majority concedes the 
bribery must be coupled with other nets 
intended to restrain bade in order to estab-
lish a violation. WhOs the majority recog-
nise* the priadple that commercial briery, 
without a m , does not violate the antitrust 
refusal to accept proposals from other se-
curity companies m the "ewrt" which is 
necessary to tun an otherwise gardao-vari-
ety tet* into aa aatitz^ vioktkm. Bow-
ever, i*y acreemaot to deal exclusively 
wkh o*s party neeeaearfy involves a refus-
al to deal wfefc ether parties Set, A* , 
Construction Aggregate Trans % Florida 
totk h* h±>nt PJi TO,, T76 01th 
Q r J W fcwtj «p4*to denl^ armiife-
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ment necessarily involves the exclusion of 
an entity which operates on the same mar-
ket level). At least absent evidence of 
other Olegal conduct, the defendants' pay-
ment of bribes did not constitute a con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy in viola-
tion of the antitrust statute. Fletcher's 
rrfitMil !<> engage the services of defend-
ants' competitors was merely the bargained 
for object of the bribes in question. Under 
the majority's view—notwithstanding the 
claim that more than a typical commercial 
bribe is required-—essentially every com-
mercial bribe would be an antitrust viola-
tion if only the payee performed his or her 
end of the bargain. 
GROUP BOYCOTT 
As the majority observes, under 
| 76-10-920 of the Utah Antitrust Act, 
only four specific antitrust violations, 
"clearly labeled as per se violations of the 
Sherman Act," are criminal offenses in 
Utah. Defendants in this case were 
charged with having committed only one 
such violation, namely a group boycott As 
the majority states, the Legislature intend-
ed that federal interpretations be con-
sidered in construing the Utah statute 
where appropriate. However, unlike with 
the Sherman Act, the Utah statute was 
designed to unambiguously define antitrust 
violations which will give rise to criminal 
sanctions in this state. See Dibble ft Jar-
dine, Ths Utah Antitrust Act of 1*7* Get-
ting Into the Stats Antitrust Businss*, 
1980 Utah URev. 78, 83. The majority 
concedes that the agreement between de-
fendants and Fletcher did not constitute a 
elastic group boycott under the federal def-
inition and that "unless defendants' eon-
duct was in the form of a group boycott, it 
was not criminal under Utah law.* 
Notwithstanding the specific language of 
the statute dictating the use of federal 
interpretations and the objective of dearly 
delineating proscribed conduct, the majori-
ty suggests that the Utah statute injects 
the traditional federal definition of the 
, woi% la conaectfaa wtlk a a l t e l foods Uhpal 
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term "group boycott" in favor of the "gen-
eral definition of boycott9' * This concept, 
according to the majority, refer* to "a 
method of pressuring a party with whom 
ooe has a dispute by withholding, or enhst-
k g others to withhold, patronage or servic-
es from the target"* Even under this 
definition, H is difficult to imagine how the 
behavior of these defendants constitutes 
any kind of boycott with antitrust implica-
tions. Fletcher accepted bribes from the 
defendants in this case so that they would 
receive the UP A L security contracts. 
Tbert was no dispute, no pressure, DO en-
listment of others to withhold services, and 
no target for elimination. It is clear to me 
that even if the Legislature meant to have 
the term "group boycott" construed in a 
less rigid way than might characterize the 
traditional federal view, it nonetheless in-
tended to have the term mean something 
reasonably concrete. Minimally, the behav-
ior sought to be proscribed by the statute 
is behavior which can fairly be described as 
a group boycott 
In my view, what defendants did cannot 
be characterized as a group boycott in any 
X The majority relies on federal cases rejecting 
the "oumcrositY" requirement of group boycott 
for die view that something less U now needed 
ID constitute a group boycott. While It is true 
that these cases have dropped the "numerosity" 
requirement, L&, concern about the number of 
conspirators In a horizontal relationship, they 
nonetheless still require the other elements of a 
group boycott: concerted refusal to deal enlist-
meat of others* and a target Sse, *£, Cens-fai 
Ave «. Oukmm Csrja, 669 T2d «04. 414 (6th 
Or.lttt). 
& the majority wigsirati that s boycott under 
*^ear general oefnBOoar oners from use term 
group boycott ss It evolved under the par as 
doctrine. Ironically, their definition was taken 
from one of the landmark cases defining a per 
it'fllegsjtfotm boycott. The definition extract-
ad from the Supreme Court's opinion was one 
which tha Court offered ts nqplsts the tsrm 
%oyc**f to common parlatttfc JfcrWJfct* 
ttMv Am Co. * AWr* 4M VJL 531. 545-46. 
m VOL wx am, s? LB*** « (*tm 
4 Whereas group boycotts ate subject to a per at 
turn of Harnlg, eaduatve deaftac atraam> 
meats art tested bj a Vtfr of reason* standard. 
iWoi City Sports*rvk% Ate. * CksrksCL Rmkj 
4<X676r\2dat l*t t . The focus of this test is 
lo first find a relevant market and then asanas 
whether competition has bona forsdosW m a 
sense. Defendants' excursion into the 
realm of antitrust was, at most, in the form 
of an exclusive dealing arrangement An 
exclusive dealing arrangement is a contract 
which involves s commitment by s buyer to 
deal only with a particular seller. L Sulli-
van, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 
471 (1977). However, such an arrange-
ment does not constitute a per se violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, tee, e.g., 
Turin City SporUervice, Inc. r. Charles 0. 
Pinley * Co., 676 F.2d 1291,1304 n. 9 (9th 
Or. 1982) (explaining Tampa Electric Co. •. 
Nashville Coal Co., 865 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct 
623, 5 LEd.2d 580 (1961)), nor does ft con-
stitute a violation of | 76-10-920 of the 
Utah Antitrust Act 
The trial court accurately categorixed the 
arrangement between Fletcher and the de-
fendants in this case as one of "exclusive 
dealing," while at the same time stating 
that application of "rule of reason9' analy-
sis4 "would result in an unconstitutional 
deprivation of defendant's rights to doe 
process of law."1 The majority likewise 
actual harm to competition. The purpose of 
this test is to determine the anticompetitive "ef-
fects" of the exclusive contract, id, rather than 
the anticompetitive "intent" as required by the 
Utah statute. 
S. The memorandum decision Is reprinted at 
Note, Oimmat Antitrust Actum m Uimk' Stmt* v. 
Afdfcen i B.Y.UJJ>ubX. 229. 251-55 (I9S6). 
The decision was written in the context of a 
denial of a motion to dismiss. While the deci-
sion simply permitted the state to proceed to try 
Us case before a Jury, the trial court shared the 
majority's view that intent is the control*** 
element of a "group boycott" charge. 
The theme of the cases dted by both parties 
Is that the mere existence of an exclusive 
vertical contract is not a "group boycott pro-
hibited by the antitrust laws. However, the 
State has alleged and should be allowed so 
prove that the defendants had specific anti-
competitive intent This can not be inferred 
from the mere existence of an exclusive verti-
cal deal but by anticompetitive, illegal behav-
ior an otherwise legal business dedsioo can 
become aa unlawful group boycott under the 
Utah Antitrust Act The State should have the 
opportunity to establish mat the defendants 
bad a specific Intent to eliminate access to the 
security guard market at the goal of their 
exdust^t dealing and that no legitimate buti-
STATE v. 
Ou«75l T24* 
admits that "the rule of reason has no part 
in the criminal provisions of the Utah Anti-
trust Act" 
TV majority, however, largely avoids 
the implications of this conclusion by mini-
mixing the nature of defendants' behavior 
and instead emphasizing their perceived 
state of mind in doing what they did. Ac-
cording to the majority, "the intent of the 
contract, combination or conspiracy is the 
deckling element" of criminality. Under 
this reasoning, even a purely vertical exclu-
sive dealing contract—which both the ma-
jority and the trial court acknowledge is 
not a "group boycott" in the usual sense— 
can be miraculously converted into a group 
boycott, at least of the Utah variety, by 
proof of an anticompetitive intent That is, 
as the trial court held, "an otherwise legal 
business decision can become an unlawful 
group boycott under the Utah Antitrust 
Act" 
The effect of this approach is to render 
totally ineffectual the Legislature's effort 
to particularise but four familiar, per se 
antitrust violations as unlawful under 
| 76-10-920, so that "both the prosecutor 
and the community at Jarge" win dearly 
know "what conduct is criminally pro-
scribed." Dibble t Jardine, The Utah An-
titrust Act of 1979: Getting Into the State 
Antitrust Business, I960 Utah LRev. 78, 
» (emphasis added). 
But why eke, tM logic goes, would the 
Legislature ktject a specific intent require-
ment into an offense which has historically 
bees thought so bad that criminal Intent 
can simply be presumed? It is obvious to 
jbe that by coupling an anticompetitive ape* 
dfic intent requirement with the group 
boycott aapeet of ft W-10-*», the Legbb-
Cstre aid not mean to obscure the issue of 
feather, the Legislature meant to avoid the 
••confusion over the Illegality of group boy-
FLETCHER 
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ootts and the governing standards/' id, by 
requiring that a readily identifiable group 
boycott be accompanied by an actual intent 
to eliminate competition. See id The spe-
cific intent requirement was added to elimi-
nate "the potentially problematic situation 
where a group boycott exists but an anti-
competitive motive does not" Id T^e 
requirement was not added to allow for a 
criminal conviction whenever there is an 
anticompetitive motive regardless 
whether there is really a group boycott 1 
believe by adding a specific intent require-
ment the Legislature meant to narrow, not 
expand, the scope of the group boycott 
crime in this state. 
SPECIFIC INTENT 
Even if the defendants engaged in eon-
duct which might arguably constitute a 
group boycott in some broad sense, I do 
not believe they did so with the specific 
intent to eliminate competition as required 
by the statute nor do I agree with the 
majority that such intent can be inferred 
from the evidence. 
According to the majority, anticompeti-
tive intent "may be inferred from the de-
fendant's conduct and circumstances.M 
The majority points to the fact that the 
contracts between UP 4 L and defendants 
were not competitively bid as is the usual 
practice in selecting security companies. 
This leads my colleagues to the conclusion 
that the intent of these defendants was 
none otherthan to eliminate "competition." 
If ooe looks at what defendants did and 
considers the market in which they did ft,* 
it is obvious they had no intent to eliminate 
competition. Tbt trial court, in instructing 
the Jury, narrowly defined the relevant 
market in this ease as "among vendors of 
security guard services to Utah Power and 
Light,- notwithstanding the fact that other 
security guard companies competing for 
£ftf dB voiced from 
_ 1 T.7. he n GTE 
«K, aiU* * sin. n.vrtxx M, m uuji see {wn% 
B U o w a marl* ejNtjslt * * * * t 
i applying the ruk of 
tit It indeed unnecessary where aa 
vfotsttoa of thtvf* st variety It at fan 
ever, I thus a cursory pecs si tht 
•urket It tattnicth* la evahsttiaa the 
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ants' conduct does not constitute a group 
boycott Even if defendants' conduct can 
somehow be shoehorned into the "group 
boycott" pigeonhole, there was no evidence 
to prove a specific intent to eliminate com-
petition, and the fair inferences point the 
other way. I would reverse the antitrust 
convictions and remand for resentencing on 
the other crimes for which defendants were 
properly convicted. 
(jo !oT»fM«imTiii> 
the UP ft L contract were also competing 
for contracts throughout the state, or even 
worldwide. However, there was DO evi-
dence that the security needs of UP 4 L 
were somehow so unique that £uard ser-
vice vendors competing for UP A L's busi-
ness were necessarily different—and few-
er—than guard service vendors generally, 
who of course are able to provide security 
services for everything from large utilities 
to retail stores, apartments, warehouses, 
churches, banks, and so on. Nor was there 
evidence to show that UP ft L was such a 
major purchaser in the local security ser-
vice market that failure to secure that con-
tract would necessarily imperil any of de-
fendants' competitors. 
While H can perhaps be inferred that the 
defendants intended to eliminate other se-
curity companies from competition for the 
UP i L contract, it simply cannot be in-
ferred that they intended to eliminate these 
companies from competition in any mean-
ingful marketplace, which is what the anti-
trust laws are designed to prevent T h e 
Sherman Act was enacted to protect com-
petition in the marketplace. It was not 
designed, and has never been interpreted, 
to reach aO business practices, unfair or 
otherwise, damaging to individual compa-
nies.* Caooade Cabinet Co. * WmUm 
Cabin* 4 MiUwork. 710 M d 1M6, 1174 
(9th Cir.lMS). Other security companies 
were not hindered by defendants in compet-
ing for security guard contracts Tb*y 
warn merely deprived of the UP * L con-
tract While this conduct is certainly not 
fflpiypfn(faille f "the not of unfair 
icsiiHing in the substitution of oc 
t^c tot another without mors does not vio-
late the antfcrwt lawn." Man&cturin$ 
lessor** Corp. t> Grwnlm Tool Go* U S 
WM 1017, IMS (Uth O r 4 t t 3 . 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial bribery docs not criminally 
vlokte the Utah antitrust lawa. Defend- Orme, in concurred and filed opinion. 
sjmnsnsa. ,3hdr punishment, however, should 
be for the crimes they committed, not those 
<hey might have committed had the Legislature 
a din a tut spprotch to < 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff a»d 
Respondent 
v. 
L. Brent FLETCHER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 8M35ft-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 9, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M. 
Bflhngm, J., of bribery, violation of state 
antitrust law, and racketeering, and be ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 
held that application of state Racketeering 
Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act to 
defendant, based in part on acts committed 
prior to enactment of Act, was not ax post 
facto application, where at least one predi-
cate offense occurred after enactment of 
}ed ftfa* snd msv ^ M M **" * • «•"* 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMEN 1 IV 
The right of tlie people to be secure in their persons, honses, .papers. 
and effects, aguinst unreasonable .searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants »hall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or tiling to be seized. 
AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a preseuunent or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases amin<{ in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
aetual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the name offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compciled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT V m 
Excess!re bail *hall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, .papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants *hall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the name offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compciled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor .shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT V m 
Excessive bail Khali not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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Treble damage* — Recovery of 
act it \ I damage* or civil penalty 
by state or political subdivi-
sions — Immunity of political 
subdivisions from damages, 
costs, or attorney s fees. 
Fine and/or imprisonment tor vio-
lation — Certain vertical agree-
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Conviciion as prima facie evi-
dence in action for injunctive 
relief or damages. 
Antitrust revolving account. 
Attorney general to advocate com-
petition. 
Venue of action* by 
Transfer. 
Statu i* of limitations. 
Interpretation ot act. 
Law Reviews. — Antitrust Issues Facing Antitrust Policy and Olympic Athletes: The 
the Ski Resort Industry: The Company Town United State* Ski Team Goes for the Gold, 
Revisited, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 813. 2985 Utah L. Rev. 831 
76-10-911. Antitrust Act — Short title. 
This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the "Utah Antitrust Act." 
History: C 1953, 78-10-911, enacted by L. 
1979, eh. 79, I 1. 
Cross-Refereocea. — Unfair Practices Act, 
I 13-5-1 tt seq 
Law Reviews. — Forum-Shopping in Ap-
pellate Review of FTC Cease and Desist Or-
ders, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 316. 
Antitrust Symposium, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 
617 et sea 
The Utah Antitrust Act of 1979: Getting into 
76-10-912. Legislative findings — Purpose of act 
The legislature Finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the 
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic, political and social institutions. 
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition 
in the interest of the general welfare and economy of this state by prohibiting 
monopolistic and unfair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the 
enforcement of its provisions. 
History: C. 1969, 76-10-912, enacted by L. 
1979, eh. 79, t 2. 
76-10-913. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Attempt to monopolize" means action taken without a legitimate 
business purpose and with a specific intent of destroying competition or 
controlling prices to substantially lessen competition, or creating a mo-
nopoly, where there is a dangerous probability of creating a monopoly. 
(2) "Commodity" includes any product of the soil, any article of mer-
chandise or trade or commerce, and any other kind of real or personal 
property. 
(3) "Manufacturer" means the producer or originator of any commodity 
or service. 
(4) "Service" includes any activity that is performed in whole or in part 
for the purpose of financial gain including, but not limited to, personal 
service, professional service, rental, leasing or licensing for use. 
(6) "Trade or commerce" includes all economic activity involving, or 
relating to, any commodity, service, or business activity, including the 
coat of exchange or transportation. 
the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utah L 
Rev. 73. 
A.L.R. — Propriety, under state law, of 
manufacturer's or supplier's refusal to sell 
medical product to individual physician, hospi-
tal, or clinic, 45 A L R 4th 1007. 
History: C. 19S3. 76-10-913, enacted by U 
1979, ch. 79, I S. 
76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities. 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, 
any part of trade or commerce. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-914, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, I 4. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
ANALYSIS 
Agricultural cooperative association. 
Illegal price-control agreement of trade corporation. 
Proof of violation. 
Agricultural cooperative association. of information for bidding — and where the fee 
Suit by milk hauler agsinst producers' asso- paid by the members was graduated upward 
ciation raised question for jury whether asaoci- based on the total bid by a member on a job, 
ation had urged members to use only it* trans-
 t n d where the fee was understood to be in addi-
portation services to further iu own legitimate tion to the actual job cost with the purpose in 
business intereaU or U> enable it to fu mini- nind of carrying out an investment program 
mum milk prices, such conduct would be just;.
 for ^  n^b*,, mnd p ^ g dividends, the 
fiable if for the former purpose, but unlawful if ^^^^ b e t w e e n ^ corporation and the 
for the latter purpose. Gammon v. Federated - . ^ ^ _,.. ._ :ii*«.» ~w^-«**-o 
Milk ^toJEZiim* |« U U »l. 883 E f ^ " ^ ^ r ^ T T f 
trade and invalid as against public policy. 
Regal price-control agreement of trade Zion's Service Corp. v. Danielaon (1961) 12 U 
corporation- 2d 369, 366 P 2d 982. 
Where a group of contractors organised a 
profit corporation which was to provide esaen- Proof of violation. 
tial information involving the economics of Proof of combine, conspiracy or agreement 
their trade and included an agreement to em* was necessary to eatabliah violation of former 
ploy a common agent to provide one essential law. Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire sV Rubber Co. 
service in bidding each J o b - a common source (1965) 17 U 2d 173. 406 P 2d 911. 
76*10-915. Exempt activities. 
(1) No provision of this act shall be construed to prohibit: 
(a) The activities of any public utility to the extent that those activities 
are subject to regulation by the public service commission, the state or 
federal department of transportation, the federal energy regulatory com-
mission, the federal communications commission, the interstate com-
merce commission, or successor agencies; 
(b) The activities of any insurer, insurance agent, insurance broker, 
independent insurance adjuster or rating organization including, but not 
limited to, making or participating in joint underwriting or reinsurance 
arrangements, to the extent that those activities are subject to regulation 
hv the commissioner of insurance; 
(c) The activities of securities dealers, issuers or agents, to the extent 
that those activities are subject to regulation under the laws of either this 
state or the United States; 
(d) The activities of any state or national banking institution, to the 
extent that such activities are regulated or supervised by state govern-
ment officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or by fed-
eral government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the 
United States; 
(e) The activities of any state or federal savings and loan association to 
the extent that those activities are regulated or supervised by state gov-
ernment officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or fed-
eral government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the 
United States; or 
(f) The activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed 
by state law. 
(2) The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exis-
tence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, insti-
tuted for the purpose of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted 
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations 
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate object thereof; nor shall such organi-
sations or membership in them be held to be illegal combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws. 
Hlftory: C. IMS.76-10-9IS, enacted by L. 
irn, ch. 7t, i ». 
76-10-916. Attorney general's powers — Investigations — 
Institution of actions — Cooperation. 
(1) The attorney general shall have authority to investigate suspected vio-
lations of this act and to institute appropriate actions regarding those sus-
pected violations as provided in this act. 
(2) Any violations of this act which may come to the attention of any state 
government officer or agency shall be reported to the attorney general. All 
state government officers and agencies shall cooperate with, and assist in, any 
prosecution for violation of this act. 
(3) The attorney general shall have the authority to proceed under any 
antitrust laws in the federal courts on behalf of this state or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies. 
Mialorr C. 1S63, Tf-10-ilt, enacted by I* 
lf?t, cfc. I t , • C 
76-10-917. Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for 
documentary material or information — Produc-
tion of documents — Oral examination — Judi-
cial order for compliance — Confidentiality — 
Subpoenas precluded. 
(1) Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any 
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, 
or may have any information relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he 
may, prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, issue and cause to 
be served upon that person a written civil investigative demand requesting 
that person to produce such documentary material for inspection, copying or 
reproduction by the state where the documents are located or produced, to 
give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to 
furnish any combination thereof. 
(2) (a) Each such demand shall state: 
(i) The nature of the activities constituting the alleged antitrust 
violation or the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, 
joint venture, or similar transaction which, if consummated, may 
result in a violation of this act which are under investigation and the 
provision of law applicable thereto; and 
(ii) That the recipient is entitled to counsel, that the documents, 
materials, or testimony in response to the demand may be used in a 
civil or criminal proceeding, and that if the recipient does not comply 
with the demand the office of the attorney general may compel com-
pliance by appearance, upon reasonable notice to the recipient, before 
the district court in the judicial district wherein the recipient resides 
or does business and only upon a showing before that district court 
that the requirements of subsection (7) have been met. 
(b) If the demand is one for production of documentary material, it 
shall also: 
(i) Describe the classes of documentary material to be produced 
thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit the 
material to be fairly identified; 
(ii) Prescribe return dates which will provide a reasonable period 
of time within which the material demanded may be assembled and 
made available for inspection and reproduction; and 
(iii) Identify the individual at the attorney general's office to 
whom such material shall be made available. 
(c) If the demand is one for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also 
prescribe the date, time and place at which oral testimony shall be com-
menced and state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall 
conduct the examination and that a copy of the transcript of such exami-
nation shall be submitted to and maintained by the office of the attorney 
general. 
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who may 
be brought within the jurisdiction of any Utah oourt and shall be served upon 
the person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena. 
(4) The production of documentary material in response to a demand served 
pursuant to this section shall be made under an affidavit, in such form as the 
demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is 
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge 
of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that 
all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has in 
good faith been produced and made available to the office of the attorney 
general. 
(5) (a) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testi-
mony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized 
to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United States or of 
the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the 
testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and 
shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his 
presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be 
taken stenographically and transcribed. The officer before whom the tes-
timony is taken shall promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the 
testimony to the office of the attorney general. 
(b) In the taking of oral testimony, all persons other than personnel 
from the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for the witness, 
the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenogra-
pher taking such testimony, shall be excluded from the place where the 
examination is held. 
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand 
served under this section shall be taken in the county wherein such per-
son resides or transacts business or in such other place as may be agreed 
upon by the attorney general and such person. 
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed the transcript shall be certified 
by the officer before whom the testimony was taken and submitted to the 
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished 
free of charge to each such witness upon his request. 
(e) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony 
pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by 
counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the 
request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to 
any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on 
the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for 
the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be 
Diade, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such 
person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any 
constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege 
against self-incrimination. If such person refuses to answer any question, 
the attorney general may petition the district court for an order compel-
ling such person to answer the question. 
(?) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testi-
mony pursuant to this section refuses to answer any questions on grounds 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person 
may be compelled as in criminal cases under section 77-45-2. 
(g) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand 
served under this section shall be entitled to the same fees andT mileage 
which are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the State rf Utitb 
Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil 
action. 
(6) The providing of any testimony, documents or objects in response to a 
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall 
be considered part of an official proceeding as defined in section 76-8-501. 
(7) If a person objects to, or otherwise fails to comply with the demand 
served upon him pursuant to this section, the attorney general may file in the 
district court of the county in which the person resides or does business, a 
petition for an order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hear-
ing of the petition and a copy of the petition shall be served upon the person, 
who may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the 
demand is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a 
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object 
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply with 
the demand, subject to such modifications as the court may prescribe. Upon 
motion by the person and for good cause shown, the court may make any 
further order in the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person 
from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or ex-
pense. 
(8) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this sec-
tion shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless ordered dis-
closed by the court for good cause shown or confidentiality is waived in writ-
ing by the person being investigated or the person who has testified or pro-
duced documents or objects. 
(9) Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the 
invocation by the attorney general of section 77-45-20. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-917, enacted by L. Crow-Reference*. — Witness feet and 
1979, ch. 79. I 7. mileage. *t 21-5-4. 21-5-8. 21-5-10 
Compiler's Notes. — Section* 77-45-2 and Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of 
77-45-20, referred to in Subsections «5xf> and 1979: Getting into the State Antitrust Busi-
(9) were repealed in 1980 For similar provi- ness. 1980 Utah L. Rev. 73, 88-94. 
•ions in the present law, see Chapter 32 of Ti-
tle 77. 
76-10-918. Attorney general may bring action for injunc-
tive relief, damages or civil penalty. 
The attorney general may bring an action for appropriate i injunctive relief, 
and for damages or a civil penalty in the name of the state or any of its 
political subdivisions or agencies for a violation of this act. The court may 
assess for the benefit of the state, a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for 
each violation of the Utah Antitrust Act. 
History: C. 19&3,70-10-918, enacted by L. A.LJL — What constitutes impairment of 
1979, eh. 79, I 8; L. 1984, ch. 19, I 1. proposed intervener's interest to support inter-
Compiler's Notes. — The 1984 amendment vention as matter of right under Rule 24(aM2) 
aubstitulod "and for damages or a civil pen- of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in antitrust 
ahy- for "or damage*-; and added the second actions, 7S A.L.R. Fad. 885. 
sentence 
76-10-919. Person may bring action for injunctive relief 
and damages *— Treble damages — Recovery of 
actual damages or civil penalty by state or politi-
cal subdivisions — Immunity of political subdivi-
sions from damages, costs, or attorney's fees. 
(1) (a) A person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business 
or property by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an action 
for injunctive relief and damages. 
(b) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (3), (4), and (5), the court 
shall award three times the amount of damages sustained, plus the cost of 
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee, in addition to granting any appropri-
ate temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief. 
(2) (a) If the court determines that a judgment in the amount of three times 
the damages awarded plus attorney's fees and costs will directly cause the 
insolvency of the defendant, the court shall reduce the amount of judg-
ment to the highest sum that would not cause the defendant's insolvency. 
(b) The court may not reduce a judgment to an amount less than the 
amount of damages sustained plus the costs of suit and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(3) The state or any of its political subdivisions may recover the actual 
damages it sustains, or the civil penalty provided by the Utah Antitrust Act, 
in addition to injunctive relief, costs of suit, and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(4) No damages, costs, or attorney's fee may be recovered under this sec-
tion: 
(a) from any political subdivision; 
(b) from the official or employee of any political subdivision acting in 
an official capacity; or 
(c) against any person based on any official action directed by a politi-
cal subdivision or its official or employee acting in an official capacity. 
(5) (a) Subsection (4) does not apply to cases filed before April 27, 1987, 
unless the defendant establishes and the court determines that in light of 
all the circumstances, including the posture of litigation and the avail-
ability of alternative relief, it would be inequitable not to apply Subsec-
tion (4) to a pending case. 
(b) In determining the application of Subsection (4), existence of a jury 
verdict, court judgment, or any subsequent litigation, is prima facie evi-
dence that Subsection (4) is not applicable. 
History: C. IMS. 76-10*19, enacted by L. 
1979, cfc. 79,1 9; L. 19S4, ch. 19,1 t; 19S7, 
eh. 1 1 1 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Tht 1964 amendment 
Meted "including the state or any of iu politi-
cal subdivisions or agencies" after "A person" 
la sabssc. (1); and rewrote subset (3) which 
read: "Neither the state nor any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies shall recover more 
than the amount of damages sustained by ree-
eon of a violation of this together with costs of 
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee." 
tlie 1987 amendment divided the provisions 
af fbrmtr Subsection (II into present Subsec-
tions <lMa> and UHb), substituting "the Utah 
Antitrust Act" lor "this act" and deleting "ap-
propriate" following "an action for** and "and 
the court shall" following "and damages** in 
Subsection 11 Ms) snd substituting **Suhsections 
f3l* (4), and t5)%" for "Subjection <3>*\ inserting 
"the court shall award three times the amount 
of damages sustained, plus the cost of suit and 
a reasonable attorney's fee** and deleting 
"award three times the amount of damages 
sustained, plus the costs of suit and a reason-
able sttorney s fee** following "permanent in-
junctive relief" in Subjection <lii*)t, divided 
the provisions of former Subsection (2) into 
preterit Subnectiont (2Ma) and (2Kb), making to prevent merger or acquiftjtion allegedly pro-
minor change throughout tho*e provision*, 
and added prexent Subjection* (4) and (5) 
Law Review*— A Survey of Injunctive Re 
lief Under Suite and Federal Antitrust Law*, 
John J Klynn. 1%7 Uuh L Rev H44 
A.L.K. — l>ive*titure an available relief un 
oVr I 16 of Cluyton Act (15 USCS I 26» in ac 
hibited under I 7 of the Act (15 USCS ft 18>, 
78 A L R Fed 159. 
What conntituteb impairment of proponed in-
iervenor't interest to nupport intervention as 
matter of right under Rule 24<aH2i of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in ant it runt actions, 
78 A L R Fed 385 
lion by private parties, 77 A L R Fed 509 Propnely of preliminary injunctive relief in 
Standing of private party under I 16 of private antitrust action** involving dealership 
Clayton Act (15 USCS ft 26) to seek injunction termination*, 79 A.L R Fed 44 
DKC1S10NS UNDKR FORMER LAW 
Requirement* for recovery of treble dam- the act* constituting auch violation proxi-
ftfte*. mately caimed the damages Recovery was hnv 
In an action to recover treble damages for ited to those at whom the violation was di-
iiyurte* compt*n*able under the former anti- reclly aimed or th<*e who had been directly 
truat utatuteh, plaintiff* had to establish a viola- harmed Gammon v Federated Milk Producers 
tion of the ant. truxt provisions and also that Aa*n (1963) 14 U 2d 291, 383 P 2d 402 
76-10-920. Fine and/or imprisonment for violation — Cer-
tain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo con-
tendere. 
|(1)] Any person who violates section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid rigging, 
agreeing among competitor's to divide customers or territories, or by engaging 
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition shall be 
punished, if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $50,000 or by imprisonment 
for an indeterminate time not to exceed one year, or both or, if by a person 
other than an individual, a fine not to exceed $100,000. The foregoing shall 
not be construed to include vertical agreements between a manufacturer, its 
distributors or their subdistributors dividing customers and territories solely 
involving the manufacturer's commodity or service where the manufacturer 
distributes its commodity or service both directly and through distributors or 
subdistributors in competition with itself. 
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this 
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by 
the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the 
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice. 
History: C. IMS, 7t-10-920. enacted by L. 1979. Getting into the Stat* Antitrust Busi 
1979, eh. 79, I 10. nexs. 1980 Utah L Kev 73. 82-85 
Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of 
76-10-921. Conviction as prima facie evidence in action for 
injunctive relief or damages. 
In any action brought by the state, a final judgment or decree determining 
that a person has criminully violated this act, other than a judgment entered 
pursuant to a nolo contendere plea or a decree entered prior to the taking of 
any testimony, shall be prima facie evidence against that person in any action 
brought pursuant to section 76-10-919, as to all matters with respect to which 
the judgment or decree would he an estoppel between the parties thereto. 
Hlttorr C. 1S53,7S-10-ttl, enected by L. 
1S7S, ch. 79, | U. 
76-10-922. Antitrust revolving account 
(1) There is created within the general fund an account to be known as the 
"antitrust revolving account" for the purpose of providing funds to pay for any 
costs and expenses incurred by the attorney general in relation to actions 
under state or federal antitrust laws, which account shall lapse only to the 
extent that it exceeds the sum of one million dollars. 
(2) All monies received by the state or its agencies by reason of any judg-
ment, settlement, or compromise as the result of any such action commenced 
by the attorney general, after payment of any costs or fees allocated by the 
court, shall be deposited to the antitrust revolving account except as other-
wise provided in this section. 
(3) The legislature may make annual appropriations to the attorney gen-
eral from the antitrust revolving account or from the general fund, to such 
extent as may be required for the administration and enforcement of the 
antitrust laws. These funds shall be in addition to such other funds as may be 
appropriated to the attorney general for the administration and enforcement 
of the laws of this state. 
(4) Any monies recovered by the attorney general based on an expenditure 
or loss from a specific cash fund shall be credited to that fund to the extent of 
the expenditure or loss. Any monies recovered by the attorney general on 
behalf of any private person or public body other than the state shall be paid 
to such persons or bodies. However, prior to any such credit or payment, any 
expenses advanced by the attorney general in any of the above actions shall 
be credited to the antitrust revolving account. 
Hietory: C. 1*53, 7S.10-S22, enacted by L. 
1S7S, efc. 79, i *!. 
76*10-923. Attorney general to advocate competition. 
The attorney general shall have the authority and responsibility to advo-
cate the policy of competition before all political subdivisions of this state and 
all public agencies whose actions may affect the interests of persons in this 
state. 
Hietory: C. 1S63, 7*10-913, enacted by L. 
vm. A m i i i 
76*10-924. Venue of actions by state — Transfer. 
Any action brought by the state pursuant to this act shall be brought in any 
county wherein the defendant resides or does business, or at the option of the 
defendant, such action shall be transferred, upon motion made within 30 days 
after commencement of the action, to Salt Lake County. 
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Remedies of person injured by a 
pattern of unlawful activity — 
Double damages — Costs, in-
cluding attorney's fee — Arbi-
tration — Agency — Burden of 
proof — Actions by attorney 
general or county attorney — 
Dismissal — Statute of limita-
tions — Authorized orders of 
district court. 
Repealed. 
Evidentiary value of criminal 
judgment in civil proceeding. 
Severability clause. 
Prospective application. 
76-10-1601. Short tide. 
This act is the Tattern of Unlawful Activity Act." 
History: C. 1963, 76-10-1601, enacted by 
L 1961, ch. M, I I ; L 1965, eh. S34, I 1; 
1967, ch- 136, I 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1965 amendment 
substituted "is known" far "shall be known and 
may bt cited." 
The 1987 amendment substituted "the Tat-
tern of Unlawful Activity Act'" for "known sa 
the Utah Racketeering Influences and Crimi-
nal Enterprise Act'". 
The phrase "this act", as used in this section, 
means Laws 1967, eh, 136, H 1 to 7, which 
appear as II 76-10-1601 so 76-10-1603.5, 
76-10-1605. 76-10-1606 sad 76-10-1606. 
Public access to complaint 
Defendants who alleged that their prosecu-
tion under Racketeer Influenced and Criminal 
Enterprises Act, 18 U.S.C.A. I 1961, and this 
Utah counterpart to that statute was intended 
merely to intimidate them and that the com-
plaint should therefore remain sealed did not 
overcome the common law right and interest in 
public access to the complaint with a sufficient 
showing of private or public harm. Huntsman-
Christensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639 
F. Supp 733 (D. Utah 1966). 
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76-10-1602. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to so-
licit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to 
engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to 
engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses, regardless 
of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority or is 
classified as a misdemeanor or a felony: 
(a) assault or aggravated assault, 5§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103; 
(b) terroristic threat, i 76-5-107; 
(c) criminal homicide, §5 76-5-201, 76-5-202, and 76-5-203; 
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, §§ 76-5-301 and 
76-5-302; 
(e) arson or aggravated arson, 5§ 76-6-102 and 76-6-103; 
(0 causing a catastrophe, § 76-6-105; 
(g) burglary or aggravated burglary, §§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-203; 
(h) burglary of a vehicle, § 76-6-204; 
(i) manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or 
theft, 5 76-6-205; 
(j) robbery or aggravated robbery, §§ 76-6*301 and 76-6-302; 
(k) theft, f 76-6-404; 
(1) theft by deception, § 76-6-405; 
(m) theft by extortion, § 76-6-406; 
(n) receiving stolen property, § 76-6-408; 
(o) theft of services, § 76-6-409; 
(p) forgery, 5 76-6-501; 
(q) fraudulent use of a credit card, (5 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2, and 
76-6-506.4; 
(r) computer fraud, Part 7, Chapter 76, Title 6; 
(s) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the business of selection, 
appraisal, or criticism of goods, § 76-6-508; 
(t) bribery of a labor official, 5 76-6-509; 
(u) defrauding creditors, 5 76-6-511; 
(v) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution, 
f 76-6-512; 
(w) unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, 5 76-6-513; 
(x) bribery or threat to influence contest, § 76-6-514; 
(y) making a false credit report, i 76-6-517; 
(z) criminal simulation, 5 76-6-518; 
(aa) criminal usury, § 76-6-520; 
(bb) false or fraudulent insurance claim, 5 76-6-521; 
(cc) sale of a child, 5 76-7-203; 
(dd) bribery to influence official or political actions, § 76-8-103; 
(ee) threats to influence official or political action, 5 76-8-104; 
(fl) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, § 76-8-105; 
(gg) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of person as public 
servant, f 76-8-106; 
(hh) official misconduct, 55 76-8-201 and 76-8-202; 
(ii) obstructing justice, f 76-8-306; 
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(jj) acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution, 
I 76-8-308; 
(kk) false or inconsistent material statements, 5 76-8-502; 
(II) false or inconsistent statements, § 76-8-503; 
(mm) written false statements, § 76-8-504; 
(nn) tampering with a witness, retaliation against a witness or 
informant, or bribery, § 76-8-508; 
(oo) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding, 
f 76-8-509; 
(pp) tampering with evidence, § 76-8-510; 
(qq) intentionally or knowingly causing one animal to fight with 
another, Subsection 76-9-301(1X0; 
(rr) delivery to common carrier, mailing, or placement on premises 
of an infernal machine, § 76-10-307; 
(as) construction or possession of infernal machine, § 76-10-308; 
(tt) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, 
I 76-10-507; 
(uu) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, § 76-10-521; 
(w) alteration of number or mark on pistol or revolver, 
I 76-10-522; 
(ww) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade name, or trade 
device, i 76-10-1002; 
(zx) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, trade name, or 
trade devices, § 76-10-1003; 
(yy) sales in containers bearing registered trademark of substi-
tuted articles, i 76-10-1004; 
(zz) selling or dealing with article bearing registered trademark or' 
service mark with intent to defraud, § 76-10-1006; 
(aaa) gambling, S 76-10-1102; 
(bbb) gambling fraud, 6 76-10-1103; 
(ccc) gambling promotion, § 76-10-1104; 
(ddd) possessing a gambling device or record, § 76-10-1105; 
(eee) confidence game, § 76-10-1109; 
(ffi) distributing pornographic material, § 76-10-1204; 
(ggg) inducing acceptance of pornographic material, § 76-10-1205; 
(hhh) dealing in harmful material to a minor, § 76-10-1206; 
(iii) distribution of pornographic films, § 76-10-1222; 
(jjjj) indecent public displays, f 76-10-1228; 
(kkk) prostitution, ft 76-10-1302; 
(III) aiding prostitution, ft 76-10-1304; 
(mmm) exploiting prostitution, f 76-10-1305; 
(mm) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, ft 76-10-1306; 
(ooo) sexual exploitation of a minor, 5 76-5a-3; 
(ppp) communications fraud, I 76-10-1801; 
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 37, 
Title 68, the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b, Title 
66, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(rnr) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 1, 
Title 61, the Utah Uniform Securities Act; 
(sss) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 11, 
Title 67, the Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act; 
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(ttt) false claims for public assistance, § 55-15a-31; 
(uuu) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 56, 
Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code; 
(vw) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of the laws 
governing taxation in this state; 
(www) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 12, 
Title 32a, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act; 
(xxx) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 10, 
Title 13, the Recording Practices Act; 
(yyy) deceptive business practices, § 76-6-507; and 
(zzz) any act illegal under the laws of the United States and enu-
merated in Title 18, Section 1961 (1) (B), (C), and (D) of the United 
States Code. 
(2) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partner-
ship, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(3) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the epi-
sodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related ei-
ther to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes com-
prising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 31, 
1981. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activ-
ity as defined by this part shall have occurred within five years of the 
commission of the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(4) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal 
or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and local gov-
ernmental entities. 
History: C. 1963, 76-10-1602, enacted by amended by Laws 19S5, eh. 234, f 2, reliting 
1* 1967, eh. 13a, 12. to definition*, and enact* the present tectum 
Compiler's Notes. — Lews 1987, eh. 238, -^ . . „ . . n p . . . e AAO 
1 2 repeal. Conner • 76-10-1S02, a. last p . ^ 1 ^ 
76-10*1603. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which 
the person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds 
derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
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pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation of any provi-
sion of 5 76-10-1603. 
(2) If a violation oft 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity 
consisting of acts or conduct in violation of S 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to forfeiture under this section 
is limited to property, the seizure or forfeiture of which would not constitute a 
prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the 
Utah Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the exer-
cise of those rights. 
(3) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law for a violation of 
I 76-10-1603, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from a con-
duct prohibited by I 76-10-1603, may be fined not more than twice the 
amount of the gross profits or other proceeds. 
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to criminal forfeiture un-
der this section includes: 
(a) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in 
land; and 
(b) tangible and intangible personal property including money, rights, 
privileges, interests, claims, and securities of any kind; 
(c) but does not include property legitimately exchanged for services 
rendered in connection with a defendant's exercise of his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the right 
to appear and be defended by counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed 
by Article I, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
(6) Upon conviction for violating any provision of 5 76-10-1603, and in 
addition to any penalty prescribed by law and in addition to any forfeitures 
provided for in this section, the court may do any or all of the following: 
(a) order the person to divest himself of any interest in or any control, 
direct or indirect, of any enterprise; 
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or invest-
ments of any person, including prohibiting the person from engaging in 
the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the 
Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States permit; or 
(c) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. 
(6) If a violation of I 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity 
eonsisting of acta or conduct in violation or f 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order that would 
amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights under 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, 
Sec 16 of the Utah Constitution. 
(7) (a) All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property described in 
Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state if the action was brought by the 
attorney general or in the county if the action was brought by a county 
attorney, upon the commission of the act or conduct giving rise to the 
forfeiture under this section. 
(b) Any forfeitable property that is subsequently transferred to a per-
son other than the defendant may be the sutyect of a special proceeding 
and an order that the property be forfeited to the state or the county, 
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing held under Subsection (14) 
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the property who at the time 
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(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of 
Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
History: C. IMS, I 76-10-1 SOS, enacted by amended by Laws 1985, eh 234, I 3, relating 
L. 1S67, eh. S3S, I S . to unlawful acta, felony, and forfeiture*, and 
CompUer'e Notea. — Laws 1987, eh. 238, enacta the present section. 
I 3 repeals former I 76-10-1603, aa last 
ANALYSIS 
Conspiracy. 
Pattern of racketeering activity. 
Conspiracy. Pattern of racketeering activity. 
Although conspiracy is one of the en inner- A pattern of racketeering activity requires 
ated acta of racketeering under I 76-10-1602, more than the mere commission of two or more 
it is not a separate basis for recovery under episodes of racketeering conduct within five 
this section but is merely a crime that may years of each other. To form a "pattern," the 
qualify as one of the predicate acta needed to commission of predicate acta or episodes of 
ahow a pattern of racketeering activity; stand- criminality must be sufficiently continuous 
ing alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state *»<* interrelated. That is, a "pattern" requires 
a cause of action under this section. Bache planned, ongoing, continuing crime and the 
Halaey Stuart Shielda, Inc. v. Tracy Coilina **«•* of continuing criminal conduct, aa op-
Bank * Trust Co. (D. Utah 1983) 658 FSupp P 0 8 ^ to »poradi^ isolated cnmrna! episodee or 
1H42 eventa. Cook v. Zions First Natl Bank, 645 F. 
8upp. 423 (D. Utah 1986). 
76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costs — Forfeiture — 
Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution 
or reorganization — Restraining orders and in-
junctions — Hearings — Special verdict — Find-
ings — Judgment and order of forfeiture — Sei-
zure of property — Sale — Proceeds — Petitions 
for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hear-
ing — Disposition. 
(1) A person who violates any provision of 5 76-10-1603 is guilty of a second 
degree felony. In addition to penalties prescribed by law, the court may order 
the person found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney general 
brought the action, or to the county, if the county attorney brought the action, 
the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of securing 
the forfeitures provided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to the state 
or the county: 
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of any provision of 
f 76-10-1603; 
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or 
eontractural right of any kind affording a source of influence over any 
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of § 76-10-1603; and 
(c) any property constituting or derived from any proceeds which the 
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from the conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful activity or from any act or conduct constituting the 
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of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to for-
feiture under this section. 
(8) (a) Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, the 
court may enter restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of 
satisfactory performance bonds, or take any other action to preserve for 
forfeiture under this section any forfeitable property described in Subsec-
tions (1) and (2): 
(i) upon filing of an indictment or an information charging a viola-
tion of § 76-10-1603 and alleging that the property with respect to 
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject 
to forfeiture under this section; or 
(ii) prior to the filing of the indictment or information, if, after 
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and 
after affording them an opportunity for a hearing, the court deter-
mines that: 
(A) there is a substantial probability that the state will pre-
vail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order 
will result in the property being sold, distributed, exhibited, de-
stroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or other-
wise made unavailable for forfeiture; and 
(B) the need to preserve the availability of the property or 
prevent its sale, distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal 
through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship 
on any party against whom the order is to be entered; 
(iii) an order entered under Subsection (ii) is effective for no more 
than 90 days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown of 
unless an indictment or information as described in Subsection (i) has 
been filed. 
(b) A temporary restraining order may be entered upon application of 
the attorney general or a county attorney without notice or opportunity 
for a hearing, when an information or indictment has not yet been filed 
with respect to the property, if the attorney general or county attorney 
demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property 
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of convic-
tion, be subject to forfeiture, under this section and that provision of notice 
would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture or would 
jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. The temporary order ex-
pires not more than ten days after it is entered unless extended for good 
cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an 
extension. A hearing concerning an order entered under this subsection 
shall be held as soon as possible, and prior to the expiration of the tempo-
rary order. 
(c) The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding 
evidence it may receive and consider at any hearing held under this 
subsection. 
(9) (a) Upon conviction of a peraon for violating any provision of 
I 76-10-1603, the jury, if the case was tried to a jury, shall be instructed 
and asked to return a special verdict as to whether any of the property 
identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsec-
tions 76-10-1603.6(1) and (2). 
169 
76-10-1603.5 CRIMINAL CODE 
(b) If the case is tried without a jury, the judge shall make specific 
written findings if he determines that the property identified in the infor-
mation or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.5(1) and 
(2). Whether property is forfeitable shall be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(10) (a) Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of 
§ 76-10-1603 and upon the jury's special verdict or the judge's finding 
that the property is forfeitable, the court shall enter a judgment and order 
of forfeiture of the property to the state or the county and shall authorize 
the attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property ordered 
forfeited upon the terms stated by the court in its order. Following the 
entry of an order declaring property forfeited, the court may, upon appli-
cation of the attorney general or the county attorney, enter appropriate 
restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory 
performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accoun-
tants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the 
state or county in property ordered forfeited. 
(b) Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an inter-
est in an enterprise or property which has been ordered forfeited under 
this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the 
enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect 
the interests of the state or county or third parties. 
(11) (a) After seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the 
attorney general or the county attorney shall direct the disposition of the 
property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provi-
sion for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest 
not exercisable by or transferable for value to the state or the county, 
expires and does not revert to the defendant. The defendant or any person 
acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant is not eligible to 
purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the attorney general or the 
county attorney. 
(b) The court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the prop-
erty pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise 
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the 
sale or disposition of the property would result in irreparable injury, 
harm, or toes to him. 
(c) The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited 
under this section and any moneys forfeited may be used first to pay 
expenses of the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure, 
maintenance, and custody of the property pending its disposition, adver-
tising, and court coats. 
(12) Regarding property ordered forfeited under this section, the attorney 
general or the county attorney may: 
(a) grant petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, restore for-
feited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other 
action to protect the rights of innocent persons in the interest of justice 
and as is consistent with the provisions of this section; 
(b) compromise claims arising under this section; 
(c) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a 
forfeiture under this section; 
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(d) direct the disposition by the state or the county of all property 
ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commer-
cially feasible means, making provision for the rights of innocent persons; 
(e) destroy or otherwise dispose of property determined to be obscene 
or pornographic; and 
(f) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain 
property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disposition. 
(13) Except under Subsection (16), a party claiming an interest in property 
subject to forfeiture under this section: 
(a) may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving 
the forfeiture of property under this section; and 
(b) may not commence an action at law or equity against the state or 
the county concerning the validity of his alleged interests in the property 
subsequent to the filing of an indictment or an information alleging that 
the property is subject to forfeiture under this section. 
(14) The district court of the state which has jurisdiction of a case under 
this part may enter orders under this section without regard to location of any 
property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section, or which has 
been ordered forfeited under this section. 
(15) To facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited 
and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of 
forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the state 
or county, the court may, upon application of the attorney general or the 
county attorney, order that the testimony of any witness relating to the prop-
erty forfeited be taken by deposition, and that any book, paper, document, 
record, recording, or other material not privileged shall be produced as pro-
vided for depositions and discovery under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(16) (a) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the 
attorney general or the county attorney shall publish notice of the order 
and of its intent to dispose of the property as the court may direct. The 
attorney general or the county attorney may also provide direct written 
notice to any person known to have an alleged interest in the property 
subject to the order of forfeiture, as a substitute for published notice as to 
those persona so notified. 
(b) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in 
property which has been ordered forfeited to the state or to the county 
under this section may, within 30 days of the final publication of notice or 
his receipt of notice under Subsection (16)(a), whichever is earlier, peti-
tion the court for a hearing to abjudicate the validity of his alleged inter-
est in the property. The hearing is held before the court without a jury. 
(c) The petition shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner under 
penalty of perjury. It shall set forth the nature and extent of the peti-
tioner's right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circum-
stances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the 
property, and any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and 
the relief sought. 
(d) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable, be held 
within 30 days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the 
hearing on the petition and any petition filed by any other person under 
this section, other than the defendant. 
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(e) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and 
witnesses on his own behalf and cross-examine witnesses who appear at 
the hearing. The attorney general or county attorney may present evi-
dence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of the claim to the prop-
erty and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition 
to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall con-
sider the relevant portion of the record of the criminal case which resulted 
in the order of forfeiture. The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence at a hearing held under this subsection. 
(0 The court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its 
determination, if after the hearing the court determines that the peti-
tioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, 
and the right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid 
in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in 
the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, 
title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the 
acts or conduct which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under 
this section; or 
(ii) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, 
title, or interest in the property and at the time of purchase reason-
ably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under 
this section, 
(g) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this 
subsection, or if no petitions are filed following the expiration of the 
period provided in Subsection (16Kb) for the filing of petitions, the state or 
the county has clear title to property subject to the order of forfeiture and 
may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee. 
History: C. 1S53, I 7t-10>lS03.5, enacted 
by L. 1SS7, ck S3S, | 4. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. 
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah 
shall have authority to enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating 
investigations, assisting grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informa-
tions, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney 
general or county attorneys* offices. 
Htoorjr: C. ISM, ?S»10»1«M, enacted by 
L, ISS1, A R I L 
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76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of un-
lawful activity — Double damages — Costs, in-
cluding attorney's fee — Arbitration — Agency — 
Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general 
or county attorney — Dismissal — Statute of limi-
tations — Authorized orders of district court. 
(1) A person iryured in his person, business, or property by a person en-
gaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of § 76-10-1603 may sue in an 
appropriate district court and recover twice the damages he sustains, regard-
less of whether: 
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury suffered as a result 
of the acts or conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful conduct alleged 
as part of the cause of action; or 
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any court of the state or 
of the United States. 
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under this section 
recovers the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(3) All actions arising under this section which are grounded in fraud are 
subject to arbitration under Chapter 31, Title 78. 
(4) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for actual damages 
for harm caused by an agent acting within the scope of either his employment 
or apparent authority. A principal is liable for double damages only if the 
pattern of unlawful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of action 
was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, undertaken, performed, or 
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
(5) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of proof is clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(6) The attorney general or any county attorney may maintain actions un-
der this section on behalf of the state, the county, or any person iqjured by a 
person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of i 76-10-1603, to 
prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined in this section and may recover 
the damages and costs allowed by this section. 
(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of 
action shall be stated with particularity against each defendant. 
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted by a private 
party under this section is dismissed prior to trial or disposed of on summary 
judgment, or if it is determined at trial that there is no liability, the prevail-
ing party shall recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the 
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the defense against the action, claim, or counterclaim, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall be commenced 
within three years after the conduct prohibited by I 76-10-1603 terminates or 
the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any 
limitation to the contrary. 
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the district court has 
Jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy iryury as defined by this sec-
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tion by issuing appropriate orders after making provisions for the rights 
of innocent persons. 
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought under this sec-
tion, the district court may: 
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions; 
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any other bond it 
considers appropriate and necessary in connection with any property 
or any requirement imposed upon a party by the court; and 
(iii) enter any other order the court considers necessary and 
proper. 
(c) After a determination of liability, the district court may, in addition 
to granting the relief allowed in Subsection (1), do any one or all of the 
following: 
(i) order any person to divest himself of any interest in or any 
control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise; 
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or in-
vestments or any person, including prohibiting any person from en-
gaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to 
the extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States permit; or 
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. 
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief provided by 
this section, and if the conduct prohibited by § 76-10-1603 has for its 
pattern of unlawful activity acts or conduct illegal under § 76-10-1204, 
76-10-1205,76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order 
that would amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected 
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court 
shall, upon the request of any affected party, and upon the notice to all 
parties, prior to the issuance of any order provided for in this subsection, 
and at any later time, hold hearings as necessary to determine whether 
any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine if 
there is probable cause to believe that any act or conduct alleged violates 
I 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. In making its find-
ings the court shall be guided by the same considerations required of a 
court making similar findings in criminal cases brought under 
i 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not 
limited to, the definitions in §§ 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-1216, 
and the exemptions in I 76-10-1226. 
Rislorr C. ISM, | Tf.10-1906, ****** by by U w t 1981, ch 94.1 1, relating to ramedica 
L» 1987, ok. 898, 1 8 . of a perton injured by a pattern of racketeering 
CompUar't Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. S38, activity, and enacts the present taction. 
I 8 repealed former I 78-10-1805, at enacted 
76-10-1606. Repealed. 
Hepnslt — Lawt 1987, cb. 188,1 8 rtpaalt ch. 834,1 4, relating to paymentt to the ftn-
I 76-10-1606, at last amended by Lawt 1985, era! fund of the elate or a county. 
174 
76-6-508. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in the business of 
•election, appraisal, or criticism of goods or lervioes.—(1) A person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor when, without the consent of the employer 
or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer or principal: 
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the employee, agent, 
or fiduciary of an employer or principal any benefit with the purpose of 
Influencing the conduct of the employee, agent, or fiduciary in relating to 
his employer's or principal's affairs; or 
TO He, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or princi-
pal, solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another upon an 
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in 
relation to his employer's or principal's affairs ;\provided that this section 
does not apply to inducements made or accepted solely for the purpose of 
causing a change in employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary. 
(2) A person is guilty of violation of this section if he holds himself 
out to the public as being engaged in the business of making disinterested 
selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods or services and he solicits, ac-
cepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal, 
or criticism. 
